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New Majoritarian Constitutionalism
Joseph Landau*
ABSTRACT: Ever since Alexander Bickel coined the phrase “countermajoritarian difficulty,” commentators have frequently described the Supreme
Court as either a “majoritarian” or “counter-majoritarian” institution. In
this heuristic dichotomy, the Justices either base constitutional law on their
own independent and subjective interpretations or they rely on extrinsic
indicators to determine constitutional meaning. In practice, however, this
dichotomy is neither clearly evident, nor clearly applied, and a third
approach—“New Majoritarian” Constitutionalism—has emerged. Under
new majoritarian constitutionalism, the Court considers (1) the actual
decisions of courts and juries; (2) legislative trends; (3) executive branch
practices; and (4) geographic disparities within various jurisdictions. This
model of majoritarianism accepts the traditional idea that constitutional
decisions must be grounded in conventional lawmaking sources and that
interpretations of vague constitutional language should accord with broadly
held, majoritarian positions. This approach, however, creatively uses
traditional indicators to a far greater extent than others.
This Article provides a new typology of majoritarian constitutional theories
that reorients our understanding of the role of objective indicators of meaning,
with major implications for scholarship and doctrine. In addition to its
descriptive power, new majoritarianism has important normative
implications—promoting institutional process values such as stability and
transparency, while reinforcing the centrality of coordinate branch dialogue
in evolving constitutional meaning.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

When Yale Law Professor Alexander Bickel, in his 1962 book The Least
Dangerous Branch, coined “the counter-majoritarian difficulty,” he
dichotomized the manner in which judicial review and constitutional
interpretation are often expressed and understood.1 The first part of the

1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986) (describing the problem of unelected judges undermining the
democratic process by resolving major constitutional questions against the wishes of the
majority); see id. at 16–17 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act
or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of
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dichotomy is the counter-majoritarian view, in which the justices say “what the
law is”2 by rendering constitutional decisions through their own faculties of
interpretation. A second and opposing approach is the majoritarian view, in
which constitutional meaning is derived from extrinsic or “objective” factors
such as state legislation and other, similar criteria that reflect the “consensus”
views of the citizenry.3
In this heuristic dichotomy, the Court is either majoritarian or countermajoritarian; the Justices either base constitutional law on their independent
and subjective interpretations4 or they rely on extrinsic indicators to
determine constitutional meaning.5 In practice, however, this dichotomy is
neither clearly evident, nor clearly applied, and a third approach—“New
Majoritarian”
Constitutionalism—has
emerged.
This
model
of
majoritarianism accepts the traditional idea that constitutional decisions must
be grounded in conventional lawmaking sources and that interpretations of
the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. . . .
[That] is the reason the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic.”).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
3. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009)
[hereinafter FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE]; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) [hereinafter
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW]; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS
SERVE AMERICA (2006); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (2009); Barry
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993) [hereinafter Friedman,
Dialogue]; Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV.
1 (1996) [hereinafter Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights].
4. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), NO. 49 (Alexander Hamilton or James
Madison) (finding necessary “some more adequate defense . . . for the more feeble, against the
more powerful” and identifying a representative republic with a truly separate judiciary as one
such defense, especially against the passions of the public controlling the government); 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 244 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the
Supreme Court as “a principally counter-majoritarian institution charged with protecting the
rights of individuals from democratic excesses”); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF,
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 66 (1991) (noting that value choices are endemic to judicial
interpretations of concepts like “liberty”). See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1980) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s insulation from politics best enables it to
protect minorities from the pressures of the majority and current events); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982) (finding the Court, despite its lack of
electoral accountability, to be essential to protect minority rights).
5. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that the decision as to whether same-sex couples should be permitted to marry
constitutionally lay not with the Court but “with the people acting through their elected
representatives”); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 801 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing the replacement of “a review system designed by the people’s representatives” with
one “defined by federal courts”); Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 17–18 (arguing
that the Supreme Court rarely acts as a counter-majoritarian force, instead “identif[ying] and
protect[ing] minority rights only when a majority or near majority of the community has come to
deem those rights worthy of protection”); Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court:
Saving the Community From Itself, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 613 (1986) (describing the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of state or federal statutes as “enforcing its own will over that of the electorate”).
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vague constitutional language should accord with broadly held, majoritarian
positions. This approach, however, creatively uses traditional indicators to a
far greater extent than others.
Critical to new majoritarian constitutionalism is the recognition that state
legislation is not the only indication of majority views. On the other hand, new
majoritarianism is not boundless. Under this framework, the Court considers
(1) the actual decisions of courts and juries; (2) legislative trends;
(3) executive branch practices; and (4) geographic disparities within various
jurisdictions. By employing a more in-depth reading of these four categories,
the Court grounds constitutional decisionmaking in objective indicators,
while preserving its own unique role in deciding how to read, interpret, and
apply extrinsic sources of meaning.6
To take just one example, consider Roper v. Simmons, a criminal
sentencing case outlawing the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile
offenders. Roper engages a highly nuanced reading of extrinsic sources of
meaning that includes (1) the 18 states whose legislatures had abolished the
juvenile death penalty; (2) the 12 states that had rejected the death penalty
for all offenders, both juvenile and adult; (3) a gubernatorial moratorium on
juvenile death sentences; and (4) the drastic decline in jury verdicts imposing
juvenile death sentences even where permitted.7 Based on the totality of these
extrinsic sources, the Court concluded that the juvenile death penalty, a
practice with superficial majoritarian appeal, was hardly the consensus
practice it was widely believed to be.8 The Court has applied new majoritarian
analysis not only in the sentencing context, where majoritarian state practices
have been prevalent for some time,9 but also within the due process and equal
protection contexts and likely more in the future.10
This Article presents new majoritarian constitutionalism through a
typology that analyzes majoritarian constitutionalism through three models.
The first is a “traditional” form of majoritarianism that finds expression in
much of the relevant scholarship; on this theory, the Court tends to outsource
constitutional interpretation to state legislation, public opinion, and little
else.11 A second and opposing view finds constitutional meaning in an open6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005).
8. See id. at 567.
9. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text; cf. Corinna Barrett Lain, The
Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 371, 377, 389, 392, 395–97 (2009)
(noting the prevalence of state-polling in the First Amendment, equal protection, due process,
selective incorporation, Fourth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment contexts).
11. See infra Part III.A. Compare Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 609 (articulating a theory
of consensus constitutionalism and “paint[ing] a picture of a judiciary far more majoritarian than
generally described”), and Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 16 n.72 (noting that
“the Court strays relatively little from majoritarian impulses”), with Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding
Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (2007) [hereinafter Lain, Deciding Death] (arguing that the “inherently
majoritarian tendencies of the Supreme Court itself” poses an obstacle “to countermajoritarian
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ended array of sources, including the positions of professional associations,
psychological and sociological studies, foreign law, and legal scholarship.12
Third, and finally, is new majoritarianism, which borrows features of both the
traditional and expansive models and is increasingly prevalent in major
constitutional cases. New majoritarianism adheres to more traditional
lawmaking sources but considers those laws in action, finding emerging
consensus in legislative trends, the practices of executive branch officials, jury
decisions, and geographic disparities to gain a better understanding of where
consensus on a given issue really lies.13
New majoritarianism not only contributes to positivistic theories
concerning the role of objective indicators in constitutional theory, but it also
helps decipher the broader purposes of constitutional clauses through a more
dynamic understanding of how “the people” express themselves—and what
they are saying.14 New majoritarianism therefore has important institutional
and normative dimensions. While this Article does not consider those issues
in full, it begins that discussion by introducing the new majoritarian approach
as well as its core tradeoffs and implications.
Following this Introduction, Part II outlines the debate surrounding
consensus-based approaches in constitutional interpretation, noting that the
literature does not always provide a clear definition of what “consensus”
means. Part III then explains how the Supreme Court has begun to address
that important question through new majoritarian constitutionalism, which,
this Article demonstrates, is prevalent across a range of controversies and
especially so in criminal sentencing and LGBT rights cases. Parts IV and V
explore, respectively, the doctrinal and normative implications of new
majoritarianism. Part IV shows how new majoritarian constitutionalism could
influence other constitutional controversies. Part V demonstrates how new
majoritarianism promotes critical institutional process values such as stability,
transparency, and dialogue. Part VI provides a brief conclusion.
II.

THE DEBATE OVER MAJORITARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

The use of extrinsic indicators is a subject of great debate among
constitutional scholars. Some believe the Supreme Court decides major cases
by looking to predominant state-law practices, majority opinion, or “the

decisionmaking”), and Lain, supra note 10, at 366 (criticizing the “majoritarian approach” of
consensus constitutionalism in which the Court announces a constitutional rule “only after a
majority of states have already done so on their own”).
12. See infra Part III.B; see also, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015)
(upholding the right of same-sex couples to marry and referencing sources ranging from
“referenda” and “legislative debates” to more unorthodox indicators such as “democratic
discourse” and “deliberation,” “grassroots campaigns,” and “studies, papers, books, and other
popular and scholarly writings”).
13. See infra Part III.C.
14. See infra Part V.
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people” writ large.15 Others believe the Supreme Court is a guardian of
marginalized groups and a defender of counter-majoritarian values;16 scholars
in favor of this view argue the Court should use its own reasoned judgment—
regardless of where the majority stands on an issue—when engaging
constitutional interpretation. Consensus constitutionalism aims to provide a
counterweight to, and critique of, the idea that it is the sole province of the
Court “to say what the law is.”17 While advocates of the Marbury view have for
decades advanced the idea of a heroic, counter-majoritarian Court,18
consensus constitutionalists generally believe this view misdescribes major
Supreme Court decisionmaking and that the Marbury view risks placing
unrealistic hope in the Court that is destined to lead to disappointment.19
15. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 97 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (writing
that the members of the Court are no more qualified to make moral judgments than normal
citizens and should defer to judge and jury decisions on such matters); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners . . . .”);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that legislation
and jury determinations should be the only factors considered by the Court when measuring
society’s evolving “conception of decency for purposes of the Eighth Amendment”).
16. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2003); id. at 76 (noting the Supreme
Court’s “essential mission of protecting individual rights”); see also Robert Post, The Supreme Court
Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1272 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court is “the highest and the last
source of appellate review, whose chief function [is] correctly to discern and to protect the federal
rights of litigants”); Recent Publications, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2254, 2256 (2007) (reviewing REBECCA
E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (2006)) (“The federal courts have acquired the honored distinction—at least
among constitutional law students and scholars—of being the primary guarantors of individual
rights . . . .”); cf. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and
Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1127 (2010) (“The courts thus could not rely on the
people to protect individual rights because even if the people cared about those rights in a
general sense, Chief Justice Gibson doubted whether they would notice the breach of those rights
and do anything in response.”).
17. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Henry Monaghan has noted that the
conventional understanding of Marbury “as requiring independent judicial judgment on
questions of law” overlooks a narrower model of “dispute resolution,” akin to ultra vires review,
which lies at the core of that holding. Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda
Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 672–75 (2012).
18. See Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 1–3 (discussing scholars such as
Kenneth Karst and Laurence Tribe, who embrace a “heroic” role of the Court in which the Court
“protect[s] minority rights from majoritarian overreaching”); see also Paul L. Murphy, Book
Review, 65 MINN. L. REV. 158, 165 (1980) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980)) (arguing that in the absence of the Court’s “secondguessing the substantive merits of laws . . . the populous is left at the mercy of legislative majorities—
majorities whose proclivity for passing bad laws through legitimate means is certainly not unknown
in this country”). For a critique of this view, see generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1st ed. 1991) (expressing reservations about
the Court’s ability to effect social reform and attributing such a role to the Judiciary).
19. Friedman argues that “[d]espite the breathless way people spoke, and still speak, about
the Warren Court, the deeper lesson of that time was not about the judiciary’s ability to effect
revolutionary change but about the inherent limitations that the Supreme Court faces when it
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A. INSIDE THE CONSENSUS CONSTITUTIONALISM DEBATE
1. Consensus Constitutionalism and Majoritarian Influences
Much of consensus scholarship reframes our understanding of judicial
review as a product of extra-judicial forces (social, political, cultural) and a
call for legal scholars to abandon the false hope in a counter-majoritarian
Court. Michael Klarman, a leading exponent of consensus constitutionalism,
argues that “[i]t is time for constitutional historians to explode [the countermajoritarian] myth, to identify and describe the parameters within which
judicial review actually operates, and to create a richer and more credible
account of the twentieth century’s civil rights and civil liberties revolutions.”20
Consensus scholars tend to find those parameters within majoritarian
legislation. According to Barry Friedman, another major scholar of consensus
constitutionalism, “the Court, in defining the nature of constitutional rights,
often refers to majoritarian sources of decision” and “reflect[s] majority will
more often than we think.”21 For Friedman, “courts defer to—indeed offer
support to—the decisions of ostensibly majoritarian government.”22 Jeffrey
Rosen, another prominent consensus scholar, makes a similar argument: “Far
from protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority or thwarting
the will of the people, courts for most of American history have tended to
reflect the constitutional views of majorities.”23
Consensus-backers see majoritarian influences as a reliable helpmate in
the judicial resolution of hard cases: “Whenever a principle presents itself for
which the Court seems to lack hard evidence, it puts its finger on the
American pulse.”24 Despite the commonly held view that major Supreme
Court rulings involving school desegregation, abortion rights, and same-sex
marriage are the product of counter-majoritarian decisionmaking,25 backers

attempts to do so.” FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 238; see also id. at 259 (“The
constant theme of the Court’s prominent critics in the legal academy after 1957 was that majority will
is frustrated when unelected and unaccountable judges strike down legislative and executive acts.”).
20. Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 67.
21. Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 601, 607.
22. Id. at 592.
23. ROSEN, supra note 3, at xii.
24. Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 596.
25. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 285, 287
(1983) (providing Brown v. Board of Education as an example of the way “that the courts, whose
members are relatively insulated from day-to-day partisan politics, will restrain the majority’s worst
excesses, in the name of the constitutional values that define our national community”); Jonathan
P. Kastellec, Empirically Evaluating the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: Public Opinion, State Policy, and
Judicial Review Before Roe v. Wade, 4 J.L. & CTS. 1, 3 (2016) (arguing that at the time Roe was
decided, “a majority of state majorities did not favor such a policy [on abortion]” and that “the
policy announced in Roe was countermajoritarian to some degree”); cf. Michael J. Klarman,
Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 473 (2005) (describing Brown and
Lawrence as counter-majoritarian decisions that created political backlash because “[t]hey
raise[d] the salience of an issue, they incite[d] anger over ‘outside interference’ or ‘judicial
activism,’ and they alter[ed] the order in which social change would otherwise have occurred”).
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of consensus constitutionalism argue that major decisions such as Brown v.
Board of Education are more a reflection of the prevailing view of the times
influenced by social movements and accrued understandings shared by “the
people” more broadly.26 Groundbreaking decisions are thus the result of “the
social, political, and ideological context within which judges function,”27 and
so-called “jurisprudential transformations” are less the result of the Court’s
independent, counter-majoritarian function and more “dependent upon the
broad sweep of historical forces.”28
Consensus constitutionalists dispute the idea that the Supreme Court is
the civil libertarian institution it is often made out to be; rather, they argue
that the Court generally does not protect minority rights unless doing so is
consistent with the views of the majority.29 Whatever “psychological
imperative” may exist “for believing in the Court’s countermajoritarian
heroics, the historical record plainly suggests that such a view is chimerical.”30
After all, “[j]udges who generally reflect popular opinion are unlikely to have
the inclination, and they may well lack the capacity, to defend minority rights
from majoritarian invasion.”31 Thus, despite the “powerful hold” Marbury
“exercises . . . over our constitutional discourse . . . . [t]he Supreme Court
does not play the strong countermajoritarian role in defense of individual
liberties that popular wisdom ascribes to it.”32 By framing constitutional law
this way, consensus scholars do away with and reject the “easy assumption
about judicial trumping of majority will,” which “may well be incorrect.”33
A few consensus scholars reject the Marbury view not only as descriptively
inaccurate but also normatively unappealing, producing decisions that lack
legitimacy and are prone to backlash because out of step with the opinions of

26. Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 608 (noting that Brown v. Board of Education, at the
time it was decided, was supported by majoritarian public opinion). Klarman argues that “Brown
is [thus] better understood as the product of a civil rights movement spawned by World War II
than as the principal cause of the 1960s civil rights movement.” Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights,
supra note 3, at 7.
27. Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 18.
28. Id. at 7.
29. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW, supra note 3, at 450 (“[The] courts are likely to protect only
those minorities that are favorably regarded by majority opinion. Ironically, when a minority
group suffering oppression is most in need of judicial protection, it is least likely to receive it.”).
30. Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 24.
31. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW, supra note 3, at 6.
32. Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 2, 7. Klarman does of course accept
some room for the occasional counter-example. See id. at 6 (“[M]y purpose here is neither to
deny that some scholars appreciate the overblown nature of the countermajoritarian hero image
nor to dispute that the Court does occasionally play a limited countermajoritarian function. Both
the countermajoritarian capacity of the Court and scholars’ assessment of that capacity are
measured along a continuum. My claim is only that the Court’s capacity to protect minority rights
is more limited than most justices or scholars allow.” (emphasis omitted)).
33. Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 607.
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the broader public.34 These scholars worry that counter-majoritarian rulings
will undermine the Court’s reputation as a viable and trustworthy
institution.35 They support the outsourcing of constitutional meaning to
extrinsic indicators—primarily majoritarian viewpoints and state legislation—
as a superior and more realistic anchor for constitutional interpretation.
Rosen argues, for example, that the Court, rather than being a defender of
“vulnerable minorities,” should follow majoritarian opinions even when the
democratically elected branches fail to do so.36 Courts preserve “their
legitimacy and independence” when they are receptive and responsive to the
views of the majority of the American people and refrain from engaging in
activist decisionmaking that exceeds the bounds of what most Americans are
willing to accept.37 Thus, the Court “should hesitate to strike down state laws
unless it is confident that a clear national consensus, represented by a strong
majority of states, has, in fact, materialized.”38
2. Critiques of the Consensus Model
While backers of consensus constitutionalism look outward to
majoritarian state practices for indication of constitutional meaning, critics of
consensus constitutionalism tend to look inward, extoling the independent
role of the Justices to shape the Constitution based on their subjective
judgments of law and morality.39 Among these critics are civil libertarian
scholars, who believe that constitutional law is shaped by the Justices’
experience, expertise, values, and commitments—not the views of state
legislatures.40 Outsourcing constitutional meaning to extra-judicial sources

34. See ROSEN, supra note 3, at xii (asserting that “the most descriptively accurate” view of
the role of the courts is that of the courts following public opinion, and when courts “act[]
unilaterally” by “impos[ing] a constitutional vision that a majority of the country rejects,” backlash
results; thus courts should continue to follow majoritarian viewpoints).
35. Id. at xiv (stating that when courts interfere on a hotly debated political issue, they
“imperil their own legitimacy”); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2624 (2015)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he legitimacy of this Court” depends on the respect
given its decisions, which in turn depends on judicial humility, restraint, and deference to the
democratic process).
36. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 5. This leads to the intriguing if counterintuitive proposition
that courts “express the views of popular majorities more faithfully than the people’s elected
representatives.” Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id.; see also id. at 13 (“My point is that judges should identify the constitutional views of
the people by using whatever combination of the usual methodologies they find most reliable
and then enforce those views as consistently as possible.”); id. at 210 (“The courts can best serve
the country in the future as they have served it in the past: by reflecting and enforcing the
constitutional views of the American people.”).
39. See supra note 18.
40. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 47 (1989) (asserting the “desirability of judicial value
choices”). Chemerinksy argues that Justices’ personal values “crucially influence [their] decision
as to what the Constitution means” and that no interpretative method is bereft of a given Justice’s
personal values. Id. at 95–96. Thus, for Chemerinksy, judicial deference to majoritarian
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leaves in place the status quo and “legitimize[s] advances already made by the
other departments and opinions already the conventional wisdom.”41
Consensus-critics oppose constitutional theories that provide no occasion for
the Court “to clash with majority preferences,”42 rejecting scholarship that
endorses that view.
Other scholars who accept the central positivistic claim of consensus
constitutionalism still find the Court’s particular brand of outsourcing to be
unsatisfying, if not deeply problematic. For example, Corinna Lain writes that
the “Court routinely—and explicitly—determines constitutional protection
based on whether a majority of states agrees with it.”43 Lain deciphers a
consensus-based approach across a range of constitutional contexts including
the First Amendment,44 equal protection,45 due process,46 selective
incorporation,47 and the Fourth and Sixth Amendments;48 in all of these
areas, she argues, the Court derives constitutional meaning by counting or
“polling” the number of state legislatures that have either endorsed or
prohibited a particular practice.49 Lain finds this narrow form of
majoritarianism wanting,50 and she argues that majoritarianism, as practiced,
undermines the Court’s role as a check on coordinate institutions,
“shatter[ing] the conventional understanding of the Court as a
countermajoritarian institution” and “shak[ing] the bedrock principles of
constitutional law.”51 The problem with consensus constitutionalism, she
explains, is that it fails to safeguard vulnerable minorities from mistreatment

institutions has not “avoided value choices by deferring to the political process” because “in reality
[the Court] has made a value choice in choosing such deference.” Id. at 100; see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing the “Court[’s] . . .
duty, when the issue is properly presented, to determine the constitutional validity of a challenged
punishment, whatever that punishment may be” and since “[t]hat issue confronts [the court],
. . . the task of resolving it is inescapably [theirs].” (alteration in original) (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958))).
41. Furman, 408 U.S. at 268 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan
M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1782 (1970)).
42. Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 758 (2011).
43. Lain, supra note 10, at 368–69.
44. Id. at 392.
45. Id. at 389.
46. Id. at 371.
47. Id. at 377–78.
48. Id. at 395–98.
49. Lain describes a number of cases where the Supreme Court used state polling to reach
a conclusion about constitutional meaning. See, e.g., id. at 390 (discussing San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)); id. at 393 n.158 (discussing Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983)); id. at 396 (discussing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)); id. at 398
(discussing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
50. See id. at 366 (criticizing the “majoritarian approach” of consensus constitutionalism in
which the Court announces a constitutional rule “only after a majority of states have already done
so on their own”); see also Lain, Deciding Death, supra note 11, at 3–8.
51. Lain, supra note 10, at 369–70.
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by majorities: “[A] check on majority will that depends on majority will is
hardly a check at all.”52
B. WHAT THE CONSENSUS DEBATE MISSES
Part of the rationale for a consensus or majority-based constitutionalism
is interpretive necessity: Because so many of the Constitution’s words and
phrases lack any clear or obvious meaning—from “due process” to “equal
protection” to “cruel and unusual punishments”—the only way for the Court
to properly “give content to the document’s indeterminate phrases”53 is
through determining, and endorsing, the majority position on a given
constitutional issue.54 On this view, constitutional rulings that reflect broad
majoritarian support will be more likely to stand the test of time, preventing
backlash and preserving judicial integrity.55 Because “[j]udges cannot always
know whether they are right, even about the meaning of the Constitution . . .
intense public convictions may provide relevant information about the
correctness of their conclusions.”56 From this perspective, majoritarian
viewpoints and state legislation provide the Court with indicators that will
ground constitutional meaning in something clear, concrete, and enduring.
Notwithstanding the appeal of consensus constitutionalism, the actual
concept of “consensus” has remained very difficult to specify. Moreover,
evidence in support of a consensus-oriented Court can often be highly
theoretical and abstract. Although its adherents claim to bring theory into
better alignment with the actual operation of the Supreme Court, the
conventional consensus literature has not produced a definition of what
“consensus” or “majoritarianism” actually means, making it harder to
pragmatically “identify and describe the parameters within which judicial
review actually operates”57 and describe “the more practical question of how
judicial review actually operates as a check and balance.”58 Generally speaking,
consensus scholars are clearer about what consensus is not rather than what it
is: “Polls are hardly a reliable indicator”59 because they can be misleading;
52. Id. at 417.
53. Driver, supra note 42, at 770.
54. See KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW, supra note 3, at 5–6 (“[B]ecause constitutional law is
generally quite indeterminate, constitutional interpretation almost inevitably reflects the broader
social and political context of the times. . . . In the absence of determinate law, constitutional
interpretation necessarily implicates the values of the judges, which themselves generally reflect
broader social attitudes.”).
55. See id. at 453 (“When people strongly favor a particular policy about which the
Constitution offers no determinate guidance, they are understandably inclined to construe the
document to support that policy. Because the justices broadly reflect society, if most people feel
strongly about a particular policy, it is likely that most justices will as well. They will then face the
same temptation to constitutionalize the position that they support as a policy matter.”).
56. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 143.
57. Klarman, Rethinking Civil Rights, supra note 3, at 67.
58. Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 627.
59. ROSEN, supra note 3, at 9.
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after all, minor changes in how a question is asked can dramatically impact
polling results.60 Neither is Congress a proper bellwether of the nation’s views
on a particular matter.61 While Friedman notes “the Court’s dependence on
popular support,”62 that still begs the question: What does “popular support”
actually mean? Friedman adds that “when judicial decisions wander far from
what the public will tolerate, bad things happen to the Court and the
justices.”63 This claim sounds perfectly reasonable, yet it leaves questions
unanswered about how exactly a court would apply this concept in practice.64
While this definitional ambiguity does not detract from the appeal of
consensus constitutionalism, it makes it harder to understand the metes and
bounds of consensus-oriented methodology and exactly how one can be
certain that courts are following it.
All of this raises a question whether “majoritarian” or “consensus”-based
decisions really should turn on the simple arithmetic of counting states: Given
the wide variances in state populations, treating states as the primary unit of
measurement has risks.65 Moreover, state legislation is often stalled by tiny
minorities; in many states, a single legislator on a single committee can defeat

60. See, e.g., Jon A. Krosnick et al., Survey Research, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN
SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 404, 426 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2d ed. 2014)
(noting how word choices “can have a big impact on [survey] responses”); Questionnaire Design, PEW
RES. CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/methodology/u-s-survey-research/questionnaire-design
(last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (describing a 2003 survey regarding support for military intervention in
Iraq in which responses differed when respondents were provided with information about U.S.
casualties); see also ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 236 (noting that “differences in question wording
and question order turn out to make a difference in responses” in surveys about abortion).
61. Rosen argues that, while Congress historically was “the most reliable representative of
the constitutional views of the American people,” it no longer serves that role. ROSEN, supra note
3, at 9. Rosen argues at times that courts should look to state constitutions and state laws for a
more “objective measure of a national consensus.” Id. at 9–12.
62. FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 371.
63. Id. at 375.
64. Rosen, rather than define what might constitute evidence of a national consensus,
largely brackets that critical descriptive question and instead jumps to the normative takeaway
that judges should identify such national consensus and “enforce those views as consistently as
possible,” because that is how courts “maintain their democratic legitimacy.” ROSEN, supra note
3, at 13; see also id. (“Judges should be free to strike down laws if they believe, in good conscience,
that the Constitution requires it, but they should be wary about rejecting the competing
constitutional views of Congress, the presidents, or a majority of the states unless the case for
invalidation is very strong.”).
65. Under a traditional approach, Wyoming’s population of roughly 600,000, QuickFacts:
Wyoming, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/WY (last visited Dec. 27,
2017), would carry the same weight in determining what constitutes a national consensus as
California’s population of 39 million. See QuickFacts: California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). But surely any attempt to measure a
truly majoritarian decision should take those differences into consideration. Cf. Paul A. Diller,
Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1—The Urban Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L.
REV. 287, 308 (2016) (“[G]iving each state equal suffrage . . . violates the principle of oneperson, one-vote” given the enormous disparity between states such as, in the most dramatic
example, California and Wyoming).
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a bill supported by the remainder of the chamber.66 Indeed, the default
position of most legislatures is the status quo—not action.67 Securing a
legislative majority—or even a supermajority—in support of a bill is no
guarantee of passage.
The limitations of using state legislation as the sole or primary indicia of
“popular support” indicate that consensus constitutionalism should turn on
more than a few fixed and static indicators. Indeed, the Court’s actual
consensus-based decisions eschew a narrow, state-legislation-based model.
The Supreme Court, across a range of cases, has drawn on a theory of
majoritarianism that is far more dynamic and complex than state-polling.
Sometimes the Court finds a consensus through canvassing a broad range of
indicators, including some that traditionally do not carry legal or
constitutional weight. Other times the Court hews more closely to traditional
legal sources but places those sources to novel and surprising ends—often
overturning statutes that superficially seem majoritarian but are, on further
reflection, legal outliers. The more one understands the Court’s varied uses
of consensus, the more a reappraisal of the very idea of majoritarianism
becomes both necessary and possible.
III.

NEW MAJORITARIANISM ASCENDANT

A number of recent decisions spanning criminal sentencing and LGBT
rights provide new insights into the question surrounding what “consensus”
actually means. While some Justices have made clear that only the narrowest
set of objective indicators count toward a definition of “consensus” and others
take a far more wide-ranging approach, a remaining position—New
Majoritarianism—provides a viable middle ground. This approach applies a
more comprehensive analysis of traditional lawmaking indicators that
preserves the Court’s unique role in determining how to read, interpret, and
apply extrinsic indicators. New majoritarianism finds nationwide consensus
by looking to: (1) the actual practices of courts and juries; (2) the pace of
legal change in a small number of jurisdictions that reflects an emerging
national consensus; (3) decisions by state executive branch actors, including
gubernatorial moratoria and commutations; and, finally, (4) geographic
disparities across jurisdictions, both at the state and county level. While this
approach acknowledges the traditional idea that constitutional law should be
66. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 4, at 19–21 (describing the enormous power of committee
chairpersons, whose “immense influence” upends “the democratic precept of majority rule”);
Catherine J. Barrie, Demystifying the Legislative Process, 50 J. MO. B. 197, 199 (1994) (noting the power
of a committee chair “as to whether and when to set a hearing on the bill; bring the bill up for a vote
by the committee; and, if the measure is voted ‘do pass’ by the committee, whether and when to
report the bill back to the leadership for possible placement on the House or Senate calendar”).
67. See Richard Neely, Obsolete Statutes, Structural Due Process, and the Power of Courts to Demand
a Second Legislative Look, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 275 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)) (observing that “a force of inertia” keeps
statutes effective, with the odds of change “a hundred to one in favor of the status quo”).
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grounded in consensus politics, it makes far more enterprising use of
traditional legal indicators, preserving the Court’s critical role in determining
how majoritarian sources should be considered in the larger constitutional
equation.
A. THE TRADITIONAL MAJORITARIAN MODEL
The contours of the Supreme Court’s varying approaches to consensus
are nicely displayed in the sentencing context, where the Court has often used
a national consensus analysis to determine whether various penalties comport
with “evolving standards of decency”68 under the Eighth Amendment.69
Furman v. Georgia, a 1972 decision imposing a de facto moratorium on the
death penalty, illustrates a range of models regarding majoritarianism.70 The
dissenting Justices advanced the traditional approach—looking to state
legislation, majority opinion, and little else. Writing for all four dissenters,
Justice Powell argued that “the first indicator of the public’s attitude must
always be found in the legislative judgments of the people’s chosen
representatives.”71 Because roughly 40 jurisdictions authorized the death
penalty and that number “remained relatively static since the end of World
War I,”72 there was little doubt that the death penalty comported with the
nation’s evolving standards of decency.
In the wake of Furman’s short-lived moratorium on the death penalty, 35
state legislatures instituted the death penalty for certain crimes resulting in
death, Congress permitted the death penalty via statute, and the State of
California authorized capital punishment through a statewide referendum.73
Citing those legislative judgments, and consistent with the conventional
model, Gregg v. Georgia upheld capital punishment against a per se

68. The Court first adopted this phrase in Trop v. Dulles, and it has recited it routinely in
cases since then. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554
U.S. 407, 419–21 (2008); Ian P. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 303,
304 (2013); Robert J. Smith et al., The Way the Court Gauges Consensus (and How to Do It Better), 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 2397, 2403–05 (2014).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
70. Furman was an incredibly narrow holding; five Justices could agree only that then-extant
death penalty regimes vested too much sentencing discretion in judges and juries, resulting in
capital sentences that lacked any consistency or regularity. For this reason, the Court in Furman
rejected only the “imposition and carrying out” of the death penalty rather than a per se rejection
of the death penalty. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
71. Id. at 437 (Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger argued in similar fashion “that
the reported results have shown nothing approximating the universal condemnation of capital
punishment that might lead us to suspect that the legislatures in general have lost touch with
current social values.” Id. at 385–86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 437 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court noted that 40 states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government retained the practice. Id.
73. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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challenge,74 grounding its analysis in a narrow range of indicators—primarily
state legislation—to determine constitutional meaning.
The lead opinion in Gregg, jointly authored by Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, rejected “subjective judgment”75 and instead “look[ed] to
objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.”76
State legislation provided strong “indication of society’s endorsement of the
death penalty for murder.”77 The Court would “presume [the] validity” of a
legislative act regarding punishment—especially for crimes involving
murder—by placing a “heavy burden . . . on those who would attack the
judgment of the representatives of the people.”78 Deference was especially
warranted to “state legislatures . . . where the specification of punishments is
concerned, for ‘these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.’”79
The traditional approach can also be traced to a number of due process
and equal protection cases. Consider Lawrence v. Texas, for example, which
invalidated anti-sodomy laws in 13 states and reversed the then-relatively
recent Bowers v. Hardwick decision.80 While portions of Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion relied on new majoritarian approaches,81 he noted, in
traditionalist fashion, that anti-sodomy laws were unsupported by
conventional indicators, with 37 states eliminating their anti-sodomy laws.
And of the remaining 13 states, only “4 enforce[d] their laws . . . against
homosexual conduct”82—rendering the proscription on same-sex behavior at
the core of Bowers even more of an outlier. Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion,
arguing in favor of the constitutionality of challenged provisions, also invoked

74. See id. at 180–81, 187 (“[W]e are concerned here only with the imposition of capital
punishment for the crime of murder, and when a life has been taken deliberately by the offender,
we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate to the crime. It is an extreme
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes.” (footnote omitted)). It should be noted that
no more than three justices signed onto any one opinion in Gregg, though all seven concurring
justices appear to have agreed with the proposition that capital punishment was appropriate at
least for the crime of murder. Id.
75. Id. at 173.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 179.
78. Id. at 175.
79. Id. at 176 (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
80. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. . . . Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”). The
Supreme Court is loath to overrule itself in general, and it is exceedingly rare for the justices to
even consider reversing a decision of such recent vintage. Yet in Lawrence Justice Kennedy directly
criticized the less than 20-year-old Bowers opinion and stated that not only was the decision
incorrect due to changes in society between 1986 and 2003, but it was incorrect at the time it was
written. Id. at 576, 578.
81. See infra notes 138–44 and 177–82 and accompanying text.
82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572–73 (noting that “before 1961 all 50 states had outlawed
sodomy”; that at the time of Bowers v. Hardwick, “24 States and the District of Columbia had
sodomy laws”; and that by the time of Lawrence, that number had been “reduced now to 13, of
which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct”).
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conventional majoritarian analysis.83 As Scalia noted, the Court traditionally
accords substantive due process protections only to those “fundamental”
rights “deeply rooted in . . . history and tradition”;84 in light of this, the
national consensus arguably supported the status quo given the combination
of: (1) “a longstanding history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general”;85 (2) the
more than 200 prosecutions of “consensual, adult homosexual sodomy”
between 1880 and 1995;86 and (3) the states’ continued regulation of other
sexual behaviors.87 In United States v. Windsor, a decision invalidating Section
3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), Scalia, again in dissent,
championed traditional indicia of consensus. He argued that Section 3 of
DOMA, adopted by both chambers of Congress and signed by President
Clinton,88 plainly reflected majoritarian beliefs about the disbursement of
federal benefits to married same-sex couples and that the majority
undermined this national consensus by “robbing the winners of an honest
victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair defeat.”89
In Obergefell v. Hodges, which drew both on due process and equal
protection principles to recognize a nationwide right to same-sex marriage,
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion articulated the traditional
majoritarian argument, accusing the Justices in the majority of undermining
the consensus of “more than half the States,”90 slighting an ongoing political
“debate and enact[ing] their own vision of marriage as a matter of
constitutional law,”91 and undermining broader social and political progress
favoring LGBT equality outside the Court, “making a dramatic social change
that much more difficult to accept.”92 Indeed, Roberts’s portentous warnings
about a clash between judicial and mainstream values addressed the very
anxiety about judicial integrity that consensus constitutionalism was meant to
address.93
B. THE EXPANSIVE MAJORITARIAN MODEL
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the traditional model is an
expansive approach that allows for a range of extrinsic sources in determining

83. See id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 588 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)); see also
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (looking to “history, legal traditions, and practices” as sources of
fundamental rights).
85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 597.
87. Id. at 598.
88. See Joseph Landau, Foreword to Symposium: Defense of Marriage Act: Law, Policy, and the
Future of Marriage, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 537 & n.2 (2012).
89. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2711 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
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the content of constitutional meaning. This expanded model is featured in
the 1988 ruling Thompson v. Oklahoma, in which the Court declared it
unconstitutional to execute a defendant under the age of 16 at the time of
committing the underlying crime.94 Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion
considered traditional legal markers such as state legislation as well as data
regarding the infrequency with which juries had actually imposed death
sentences upon those who were younger than 16 at the time of committing
their crimes.95 These sources, combined with foreign law and the expressed
positions of professional organizations, led to the Court’s “unambiguous
conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender
is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community.”96
Stevens noted that “respected professional organizations” such as the
American Bar Association and the American Law Institute had “formally
expressed their opposition to the death penalty for juveniles.”97 He observed
further that a number of “leading” Western democracies had abolished the
practice of executing juveniles.98 He delved into penological literature
stressing the differences between minors and adults—noting widespread
agreement that punishment should be directly proportional to culpability,
and that adolescents as a class were less culpable than adults.99 And he cited
psychological literature regarding the differences in reasoning and maturity
between juveniles and adults, questioning whether certain punitive goals
could actually be attained in the case of juvenile offenders.100 Based on this
expanded array of factors, Justice Stevens concluded that executing those who

94. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion).
95. Id. at 832. Justice Stevens wrote that according to a recent study less than 20 individuals
were executed in the 20th century for crimes committed while under the age of 16 (with the
most recent execution occurring in Louisiana in 1948), and further found significance in the
Department of Justice statistics showing that from 1982 to 1986, 82,094 people were arrested for
willful criminal homicide and “[o]nly 5 of them, including the petitioner in [Thompson], were
less than 16 years old at the time of their offense.” Id. at 832–33.
96. Id. at 832. Justice Stevens added a unique twist to the normal consensus analysis of state
practices by highlighting how states treated minors differently in a number of legal contexts. See
id. at 824 (“The line between childhood and adulthood is drawn in different ways by various
States. There is, however, complete or near unanimity among all 50 States and the District of
Columbia in treating a person under 16 as a minor for several important purposes. In no State
may a 15-year-old vote or serve on a jury. Further, in all but one State a 15-year-old may not drive
without parental consent, and in all but four States a 15-year-old may not marry without parental
consent.” (footnotes omitted)).
97. Id. at 830.
98. Id. at 830–31 (noting that juveniles could not be executed in the U.K., Australia and
New Zealand and that a number of European countries had abolished the death penalty entirely).
99. Id. at 834 (“It is generally agreed ‘that punishment should be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal defendant.’” (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
100. The Court also cited literature explaining the differences in reasoning and maturity
between juveniles and adults, noting minors’ strong impulses and weak self-discipline, the lesser
deterrent effect offered by the threat of the death penalty due to their lack of foresight, and the
much greater potential for rehabilitation because of their youth and malleability. Id. at 834–38.
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were under 16 at the time of their offense “would offend civilized standards
of decency.”101
By the time of Thompson, the chasm between those Justices favoring
traditional versus expansive approaches had become plain, with one bloc
recognizing only state legislation as a barometer of constitutional meaning—
a view illustrated by Justice Scalia’s repudiation of the idea that “[m]embers
of this Court will have a better sense of the evolution in views of the American
people than . . . their elected representatives.”102 Generally, however, Court
majorities tended to accept a broader range of extrinsic sources in
deciphering constitutional meaning;103 Justices articulating the traditional
view were generally in the minority.
The due process and equal protection cases provide further illustration
of the expansive approach. In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy relied on a
broad range of sources, including the Model Penal Code and the European
Court of Human Rights; Kennedy indicated further that these same sources
should have persuaded the Bowers Court to conclude that private sexual
conduct between consenting adults was constitutionally protected.104
Kennedy also pointed to heavy criticism of Bowers in scholarly articles.105 When
Justice Kennedy penned the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges just 12
years later, he again referenced an expansive array of extrinsic indicators as
informing the constitutionality of same-sex marriage.106 Arguing that state
and federal court decisions had left the issue of same-sex marriage
unresolved,107 Kennedy noted the broad range of “debates, and grassroots
campaigns, as well as . . . studies, papers, books, and other popular and
scholarly writings” that supported the outcome.108 Kennedy also noted that a
“more general, societal discussion of same-sex marriage and its meaning” had
taken place within “the central institutions in American life—state and local
governments, the military, large and small businesses, labor unions, religious
organizations, law enforcement, civic groups, professional organizations, and
101. Id. at 830.
102. Id. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s dissent affirmed the validity of the
traditional majoritarian approach in interpreting the Eighth Amendment. Although he first
analyzed the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment, looking to Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England as published in 1769 and “widely accepted” at the
Founding, id. at 864, in deference to the precedent of Trop v. Dulles, see supra note 68 and
accompanying text, Scalia rooted his understanding of those “standards of decency” in enacted
legislation. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864–65 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion)).
103. See infra Part III.B–C (noting continued use of expansive model, along with new
majoritarian approaches, to invalidate legislation in sentencing, due process, and equal
protection cases).
104. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003).
105. Id. at 576. As discussed at infra notes 138–44 and 177–82 and accompanying text,
Lawrence also draws upon elements of the new majoritarian approach.
106. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–98 (2015).
107. Id. at 2597.
108. Id. at 2605.
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universities,”109 indicating that this very debate produced “an enhanced
understanding of the issue” and reflected a majoritarian view that favored a
constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry.110 These non-conventional
sources were now legally and constitutionally relevant, and same-sex couples
no longer needed to wait for the political process or other, more traditional
extrinsic indicators to line up behind their claim.111 Kennedy’s expansive
reading of extrinsic sources supported judicial validation of same-sex
marriage, “even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to
act.”112
C. THE NEW MAJORITARIAN MODEL
While the traditional model looks exclusively to predominant state law
practices and the expansive approach considers an open-ended array of
extrinsic sources, there is a third, middle-ground position that has become
remarkably common in recent constitutional decisions. This model of
majoritarianism accepts the traditional idea that constitutional decisions must
be grounded in conventional lawmaking sources; moreover, it endorses the
conventional consensus position that interpretations of vague constitutional
language should accord with broadly held, majoritarian positions. Yet this new
model makes far more creative use of traditional indicators. New majoritarian
constitutionalism, which has generally escaped notice, reinvigorates our
understanding of what “majoritarianism” actually means to determine where
the majoritarian position on a given issue really lies.
1. Law in Action Versus Law “On the Books”
The first feature of new majoritarianism concerns the actual practices of
courts, juries, and prosecutors to determine whether the law “on the books”
comports with the law in action. Courts deciding sentencing cases, for
example, often consider the frequency with which various punishments are
actually imposed; once it becomes clear that courts and juries are unwilling to
apply a particular sentence, that sentence may no longer enjoy majoritarian
legitimacy. This analysis can also look to the decisions of prosecutors and
other officers who implement the law: When laws go unenforced, or when
there is an abundance of favorable exercises of prosecutorial discretion,
executive non-enforcement can be as good (if not better) an indication of
constitutional legitimacy as legislative action.
Again, Furman v. Georgia is instructive. In Furman, Justice White penned
an influential concurrence that considered the constitutionality of the death

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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penalty from the standpoint of the law in action.113 Justice White observed
that “[l]egislative ‘policy’ is . . . necessarily defined not by what is legislatively
authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion.”114 Given
the infrequency with which juries actually imposed the death penalty, “even
for the most atrocious crimes,” White found “no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not.”115 The sheer infrequency of the death penalty, measured
against the occasions in which a defendant was death-eligible, showed the
penalty to be “too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.”116
And because “the policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily in juries”
had caused “capital punishment . . . for all practical purposes [to] run its
course,” Justice White found no remaining penological or constitutional basis
to support the death penalty.117
Justice White paired his more pragmatic interest in actual jury outcomes
with a deeper jurisprudential concern: Namely, that unenforced punishments
not only lacked practical utility but also raised doubts about whether they
served any true penological goal beyond “the pointless and needless
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or
public purposes.”118 Based on that analysis, Justice White concluded that the
death penalty (as then instituted) failed “to contribute to any other end of
punishment in the criminal justice system”119 and, therefore, no longer
survived constitutional scrutiny.120
White’s approach drew fire from those Justices who rejected jury
practices as unreliable indicators of constitutional meaning and dismissed
sentencing data as too easily manipulated, outcome-oriented, and
contradictory. Chief Justice Burger, advocating the traditional majoritarian

113. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310–15 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 313.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 312. Justice White’s use of jury verdict statistics was meaningfully different than
the more cut-and-dried approach favored by Justice Brennan. While Brennan’s bright-line
numerical cutoff would rely on statistics alone, Justice White’s analysis linked the available
statistics to an inquiry whether death penalty regimes had lost their retributive effect and
deterrence purpose. Compare id. at 291–93 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When a country of over
200 million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50 times a year, the
inference is strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly applied.”), with id. at 312
(White, J., concurring) (arguing that “seldom-enforced laws become ineffective measures for
controlling human conduct”).
119. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 314. Justice Stewart also expressed an interest in a more expansive analysis of
objective indicators, writing that “[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual” and concluding that “the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems
that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.” Id. at 309–10
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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model, saw jurors’ hesitation around the death penalty as a further reason to
uphold it.121 Justice Powell, also adopting the traditional majoritarian view,
argued in his Furman dissent that the data showed admirable restraint by
juries, not a practical rejection of the death penalty.122
One year after the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty as a
punishment for murder in Gregg v. Georgia,123 it invalidated the death penalty
for the crime of adult rape in Coker v. Georgia.124 Justice White’s opinion again
invoked practical disuse as an indication of majoritarian opinion.125
Examining cases in which “the jury has an appropriate measure of choice as
to whether the death penalty is to be imposed,”126 he found enough data in
Georgia’s sentencing practices to draw a conclusion about the challenged law.
In 63 cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of Georgia, only six since 1973
had imposed a sentence of death,127 data that “strongly confirm[ed]” the
Court’s judgment “that death [was] . . . a disproportionate penalty for the
crime of raping an adult.”128
More recently, the Court has shifted focus from juror behavior to a wider
range of actual sentencing and execution practices, sometimes treating those
practices as a functional equivalent of legislation.129 In Hall v. Florida, for
example, a case involving Florida’s use of a rigid IQ cutoff to determine
intellectual disability,130 Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the law in action in
Kansas and Oregon was particularly noteworthy. Because Kansas, despite
having the death penalty on its books, had not executed anyone in almost 50
years,131 the “laws and jurisprudence on this issue are unlikely to receive
attention.”132 Citing dicta from prior Supreme Court rulings, Kennedy
indicated there would be little need for legislative override in those states
where “the practice is uncommon” or where no executions “have been carried

121. Id. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The selectivity of juries in imposing the
punishment of death is properly viewed as a refinement on, rather-than a repudiation of, the
statutory authorization for that penalty.”).
122. Id. at 439–42 (Powell, J., dissenting).
123. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).
124. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1977).
125. Id. at 592, 596.
126. Id. at 596.
127. See id. at 596–97.
128. See id. at 597.
129. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996–98 (2014).
130. Id. Florida’s scheme defined intellectual disability as having an IQ of 70 or less, and if a
prisoner scored higher than 70 there could be no showing of intellectual disability. Id. at 1990.
The Court held that Florida’s rigid test “create[d] an unacceptable risk that persons with
intellectual disability will be executed.” Id.
131. Id. at 1997.
132. Id.
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out in decades.”133 Kennedy thus appeared to treat Kansas as a functionally
abolitionist state.
Oregon at the time of Hall had a death penalty law and 36 people on
death row,134 but Kennedy still treated Oregon as a non-death state on account
of two factors: First, by 2014, the year Hall was decided, Oregon had executed
only two individuals since 1976 (when the death penalty was revived); second,
in 2014, Oregon’s governor imposed a moratorium on executions.135 In short,
Oregon, like Kansas, would be deemed the functional equivalent of an
abolitionist state, notwithstanding its death penalty law.
Justice Kennedy did not indicate whether his characterization of Oregon
was based solely on the gubernatorial moratorium, the very small number of
individuals actually put to death in that state, or a combination of the two. Yet
both concepts are meaningful to new majoritarian constitutionalism. The
idea that gubernatorial moratoria can be deemed equivalent to statutory
abolition—at least under some circumstances—shows how certain practices
of the executive branch can influence constitutional meaning under a new
majoritarian framework.136 And the consideration of Oregon’s two executions
within a 40-year timespan is also meaningful because it suggests that actual
sentencing practices can be as significant as legislative action.137
The Court has also considered how prosecutorial and enforcement
practices bear on broader societal attitudes toward a particular punishment
and the constitutionality of that punishment—as demonstrated in Lawrence v.
Texas. Assailing Bowers v. Hardwick’s conclusion that anti-sodomy laws were
rooted in the nation’s history and tradition, Justice Kennedy distinguished
between the non-enforcement of sodomy laws against “consenting adults
acting in private” on the one hand and the prosecutions of prohibited acts of
133. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)). In addition to citing prior
cases, Kennedy’s Hall decision also made use of sources associated with the more expansive
approach, including multiple references to the relevant psychological literature and recounting
the views of professional associations. See id. at 1994–95 (noting how Florida’s strict method of
judging intellectual disability “disregards established medical practice”). Kennedy looked to
other, more expansive indicators as well, citing the position of the American Psychological
Association’s amicus brief indicating the wide range of information, in addition to IQ, used to
measure intellectual disability. Id. at 1994. Kennedy also discussed a study titled “The
Measurement of Adult Intelligence” to show that medical professionals have also long viewed IQ
scores as a range rather than a single, fixed number due to the variety of factors that can affect a
score. Id. at 1995. Kennedy employed these sources to demonstrate that Florida’s use of a strict
IQ threshold violated Atkins. See id. at 1995–97. However, Kennedy also noted that these studies
“inform[ed the Court’s] determination whether there [was] a consensus.” Id. at 1993.
134. David Menschel, Justice Kennedy Quietly Empowers Death Penalty Opponents, AM. CONST. SOC’Y
BLOG (July 2, 2014), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/justice-kennedy-quietly-empowers-deathpenalty-opponents (noting 36 inmates on Oregon’s death row at the time of Hall). That number is
now 33. Death-Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/deathrow-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
135. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997.
136. See Menschel, supra note 134 (“Kennedy’s doctrinal move is terribly important, because it
expands the ways that death penalty opponents can demonstrate progress to the Supreme Court.”).
137. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1997.
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pedophilia, force, and bestiality on the other.138 As to the 19th century,
Kennedy stated “that infrequency makes it difficult to say that society
approved of a rigorous and systematic punishment of the consensual acts
committed in private and by adults.”139 The 20th century followed a similar
pattern of nonenforcement, even among those states that enacted laws
prescribing criminal prosecution for same-sex relations.140 Much like Georgia
in Bowers,141 the State of Texas admitted that as of 1994, it had never
prosecuted same-sex relations between consenting adults acting in private.142
This continued lack of enforcement evidenced an “emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons” in their decisions about
their private sexual lives,143 an important step toward the conclusion that the
private, consensual activity at issue warranted constitutional protection.144
2. Legislative Trends
Another feature of new majoritarianism concerns ways that courts find
patterns and trends in a relatively small number of states to reflect nationwide
agreement. In Atkins v. Virginia, for example—a case invalidating the
execution of intellectually disabled individuals—Justice Stevens noted a
“dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape”145 during the brief, 13-year
period after the Court upheld the same practice in Penry v. Lynaugh.146
Drawing on the traditionalist insight that state legislation provided “the
‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values,’”147 the
decision by 17 states to ban the execution of intellectually disabled individuals
after Penry provided strong indications that the practice had become an
138. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003).
139. Id. at 569–70.
140. See id. at 570, 572–73.
141. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
142. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (“In those States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for
same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of nonenforcement with respect to
consenting adults acting in private.”).
143. Id. at 572.
144. Id. at 578–79 (describing the “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause” and the
Constitution’s generational evolution such that “[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom”). In his dissent,
Justice Scalia criticized the validity of the described “emerging awareness,” first as insufficient to
“establish a ‘fundamental right’” under the Due Process Clause and second as empirically false.
Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“States continue to prosecute all sorts of crimes by adults ‘in
matters pertaining to sex’ . . . . Sodomy laws, too, have been enforced ‘in the past half century,’
in which there have been 134 reported cases involving prosecutions for consensual, adult,
homosexual sodomy.”). Though Scalia appears to follow a new majoritarian approach by focusing
on actual enforcement practices, he does so at a much higher level of generality, using a more
static analysis than the more fine-grained features of new majoritarian approaches. Accord id.
(“Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen
or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior.”).
145. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
146. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989).
147. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).
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outlier.148 Importantly, Justice Stevens noted that “[i]t is not so much the
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change”
that influenced constitutional meaning.149 The stability in state-law practices
after Penry, combined with the lack of any legislation reinstating the
imposition of the sentence in question, demonstrated its counter-majoritarian
nature.150 Justice Stevens even considered (1) the margin by which the
measures to ban the practice passed;151 (2) similar pending legislation in
additional states;152 and (3) the rarity of sentences in the remaining states
such that “there [would be] little need to pursue legislation barring” it in
those holdout jurisdictions.153
The Court again looked to a nationwide trend inquiry when it outlawed
the execution of minors between the ages of 15 and 18 in Roper v. Simmons.154
As in Atkins, Roper involved a challenge to a practice (the imposition of the
death penalty on a juvenile offender between the ages of 15 and 18 at the
time of commission of a crime) that the Court had recently upheld just 15
years prior, in Stanford v. Kentucky.155 As Justice Stevens had done in Atkins,
Kennedy’s consensus analysis focused not only on the number of states
banning a practice but also “the consistency of the direction of change.”156 In
addition to the trend analysis, Kennedy considered the 18 states that directly
banned the juvenile death penalty, the 12 states that had rejected the death
penalty entirely,157 and the fact that between 1995 and 2005 only 3 states had
executed prisoners for crimes the defendants had committed as juveniles.158
Kennedy noted further that the governor of Kentucky commuted the
sentence of the defendant at issue in Stanford, “ensur[ing] Kentucky would
148. Id. at 314–15. Justice Stevens also recognized that, at the time of the decision in Atkins,
two states (Virginia and Nevada) had passed a bill through one house to accomplish the same
ends. Id. at 315.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See id. at 315–16.
151. See id. at 316.
152. See id. at 314–15.
153. See id. at 316. Justice Stevens also considered more expansive sources, noting the
“deliberat[ion]” by “the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges” that had contributed
to a consensus against executing individuals below certain IQ levels. Id. at 307.
154. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56, 578–79 (2005).
155. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). Although Kennedy noted that more
states had banned the imposition of the death penalty on mentally challenged defendants
between Penry and Atkins than had banned the juvenile death penalty between Stanford and Roper,
the development in state law was still “significant” and required the law’s invalidation. Roper, 543
U.S. at 565.
156. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
157. Id. at 564 (“30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have
rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial
interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.”).
158. See id. at 564–65. Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that the majority counted states in a
misleading way: “That 12 states favor no executions says something about consensus against the
death penalty, but nothing—absolutely nothing—about consensus that offenders under 18
deserve special immunity from such a penalty.” Id. at 610–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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not add itself to the list of States that ha[d] executed juveniles [between 1995
and 2005].”159 This combination of new majoritarian influences, including
the infrequency of executions in those states that did not ban the practice
entirely,160 led to the conclusion that the sentence was no longer the
majoritarian institution it was perceived to be.161
Hall v. Florida also focused on trend analysis by emphasizing that the pace
with which states were abandoning their support for executing intellectually
disabled prisoners provided further reason to strike down Florida’s strict
numerical cut-off.162 Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted that during the 12 years
since Atkins, 11 states either banned the death penalty entirely or allowed
defendants to present evidence of intellectual disability beyond IQ score.163
Such a rapid “‘consistency in . . . trend’ . . . provide[d] strong evidence of
consensus that our society does not regard [Florida’s] strict cutoff as proper or
humane.”164
The Court has applied its trend analysis to non-death sentences as well.
In Graham v. Florida, the Court invalidated all life-without-the-possibility-ofparole sentences for juveniles who had committed non-homicide crimes.165
Justice Kennedy, building on the flexible counting mechanism in Hall,
considered both the 13 states that had abolished the practice of sentencing
159. Id. at 565 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 564–65.
161. See id. at 567. While Justice Stevens’s Atkins opinion relegated its discussion of
international perspectives to a footnote, Justice Kennedy’s Roper decision brought the discussion
into the foreground, spanning several pages of the opinion and concluding that the Court’s
“determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18
finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that
continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.” Id. at 575. Roper thus
approximated the expanded model at times. Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Roper did not take
issue with the sources consulted by the majority in its consensus analysis. Rather, she found that
they did not provide compelling evidence of a consensus in that particular case. See id. at 595
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). O’Connor first pointed out that in contrast to past death penalty cases
like Atkins, in which legislatures tacitly permitted a type of execution through silence, here a
number of states affirmatively stated that 16- or 17-year-olds could be executed. See id. at 595–96.
She also argued that the trend evidence of a societal consensus was much weaker here than in
prior cases, highlighting that only four states that permitted the execution of minors had reversed
course in the 16 years since the Court last addressed the issue, and in that time span two states
had also reaffirmed their support for the practice by statutorily allowing for the execution of
16-year-olds. Id. at 596–97. Thus, while Justice O’Connor accepted the kinds of extrinsic markers
the majority looked to for guidance, she simply disagreed that the data provided strong enough
evidence that the nation’s view on the execution of minors had in fact changed. She concluded,
by contrast, that “the halting pace of change gives reason for pause.” Id. at 597. Justice Scalia’s
Roper dissent rejected the majority’s consensus-based approach entirely and criticized the
majority’s consensus analysis as a thinly veiled policy preference, writing in the opening section
of his dissent that “I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than
the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective
views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners.” Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997–98 (2014).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1998 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
165. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
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minors to life without parole for non-homicide crimes and the 26 states that
did not have any juveniles actually serving such a sentence, concluding that
an overwhelming majority of states had either formally or functionally
expressed their opposition to the punishment.166 In addition, the Court for
the first time equated life without parole as the functional equivalent of a
death sentence, noting that both forms of punishment “alter[] the offender’s
life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”167
Graham represented a marked shift from the Court’s prior non-capital
criminal sentencing cases, which adopted nearly automatic deference to
legislative judgment, resulting in the judicial validation of long and harsh
sentences, even for minor crimes.168 Graham’s shift toward a new majoritarian
approach set up new possibilities for revisiting sentencing practices that, prior
to Graham, appeared immune to an effective challenge.169
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court expanded Graham by holding
unconstitutional all mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders.170 Justice Kagan’s majority opinion fused
Graham with the Court’s death penalty decisions, finding that “the confluence
of these two lines of precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.”171
Notably, Miller does not reflect the core features of new majoritarian
constitutionalism, making no reference to state practices (most notably the
handful of states that had banned juvenile life without parole prior to

166. Id. at 62–64.
167. Id. at 69. Justice Kennedy’s opinion, while rooted for the most part in new
majoritarianism, stretched well beyond traditional indicators, relying on various “indicia of
national consensus” that included psychological findings and the law of foreign jurisdictions. Id.
at 62, 68, 74–75, 80.
168. In Rummel v. Estelle, for example, the Court upheld a life sentence for a defendant
convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card, passing a forged check, and obtaining $120.75 by
false pretenses. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265–66 (1980). The Court’s opinion in Rummel
acknowledged the harshness of the sentence and the arbitrary lines drawn by the statute’s rigid
rules, but nonetheless found “that Texas is entitled to make its own judgment as to where such
lines lie, subject only to those strictures of the Eighth Amendment that can be informed by
objective factors.” Id. at 284. The opinion goes on to stress its formal approach in this context,
noting that “one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of the sentence actually
imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.” Id. at 274. And with rare exceptions, the
Court has continually refused to override non-capital criminal sentencing schemes given the
“tradition of deferring to state legislatures in making and implementing such important policy
decisions.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003). The Court’s bright-line approach meant
that gross disproportionalities in sentencing would be overturned only in the most extreme cases.
See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003).
169. See, e.g., Bidish J. Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Emerging Eighth Amendment Consensus Against
Life Without Parole Sentences for Nonviolent Offenses, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 525, 547 (2015) (noting
“a slow but steady rollback of mandatory minimum laws” at the state level since 1998, “particularly
for nonviolent offenders”).
170. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
171. Id. at 470.
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2012).172 Instead, Miller adopts the expanded approach, citing a number of
prior cases drawing on scientific and psychological studies regarding
differences between the emotional and psychological composition of children
as opposed to adults.173
The Court elevated Miller’s importance by making it retroactive in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, a case grounded more in a technical application of
retroactivity but which nonetheless signals an increased role of extrinsic
indicators of meaning in future life-without-parole cases.174 Referencing the
same psychological insights used in prior cases, Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion noted that “[i]n light of what this Court has said in Roper, Graham,
and Miller about how children are constitutionally different from adults in
their level of culpability . . . prisoners like Montgomery must be given the
opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption.”175
Indeed, Miller and Montgomery already appear to be having a dramatic effect
on the states, which are shifting their practices in response to the Court’s
ruling regarding life-without-parole sentences.176
Similar insights into legislative trends permeate the due process and
equal protection contexts, too. In Lawrence v. Texas, for example, the Court
performed a careful reading of state legislation to determine whether the
existing laws actually demonstrated a consensus supporting punishment for
consensual same-sex behavior. Rather than flatly assume that the persistence
of some anti-sodomy laws evidenced a broad condemnation of homosexual
activity, Justice Kennedy explained how the context and history of these laws
undermined their constitutionality, both at the time of Lawrence and at the
time of Bowers.177 As Kennedy noted, sodomy laws, as drafted, were not
historically focused on homosexual activity; rather, they were directed at all
“nonprocreative sexual activity.”178 By contrast, anti-sodomy laws specifically
targeting homosexual activity were a new and recent phenomenon—indeed,
the earliest such law was enacted as late as 1970,179 with only nine states
following suit.180 Moreover, Kennedy observed that even states that took steps
to ban homosexual relations had in recent decades begun to repeal those
172. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
173. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476.
174. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
175. Id.
176. See infra notes 226–51 and accompanying text.
177. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (“[T]he historical grounds relied upon in
Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice
Burger indicate. Their historical premises are not without doubt and, at the very least, are
overstated.”); see also id. at 567–68 (“In academic writings, and in many of the scholarly amicus
briefs filed to assist the Court in this case, there are fundamental criticisms of the historical
premises relied upon by the majority and concurring opinions in Bowers.”).
178. Id. at 568.
179. Given their recent vintage, these laws hardly reflected the “ancient roots” Bowers
referenced. See id. at 570 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).
180. Id.
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laws.181 The actual practices of the states led the Court to conclude that
“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”182
United States v. Windsor also looked to extrinsic markers—primarily the
positive law of the states and the position of the Executive Branch183—to
invalidate a federal statute. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion cited New
York’s “statewide deliberative process” as indicative of an emerging
consensus;184 moreover, he recognized how trends in state laws had moved
constitutional culture toward “a new perspective, a new insight” that it was
“unjust” to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages.185 This emerging
movement in state law highlighted an “urgency . . . for same-sex couples who
wanted to affirm their commitment to one another before their children,
their family, their friends, and their community.”186 By the time of Obergefell v.
Hodges, that progression had advanced even further. As Kennedy noted in his
majority opinion, states were steadily shifting toward recognition of the right
to marry, with 37 states performing same-sex marriages by the time of
Obergefell187—a trend indicating the truly majoritarian nature of the right of
same-sex couples to marry.
3. Geographic Disparities
In 2015, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Oklahoma’s
execution protocol in Glossip v. Gross.188 The petitioners argued that
Oklahoma’s practices “create[d] an unacceptable risk of severe pain” and
were thus unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.189 Justice Alito’s
majority opinion found that the petitioners failed to provide evidence of an
adequate alternative method of execution and, accordingly, failed to meet the
extraordinarily high burden the law imposed for a preliminary injunction.190
Notwithstanding Glossip’s actual holding, the case has become associated with
a broader debate regarding the per se constitutionality of the death penalty;

181. Id. at 570–71, 573.
182. Id. at 578. The Court went on to explain why the right at issue was constitutionally
protected. Id. (“Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.”).
183. For a discussion of the function of executive branch constitutionalism in new
majoritarian analysis see supra Part III.C.1.
184. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689, 2692 (2013).
185. Id. at 2689; see also id. at 2689 (noting that the recognition of same-sex marriage started
“[s]lowly at first[,]” but then more legal change occurred “in rapid course,” with New York and 11
other states recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry as of the day Windsor was issued).
186. Id.
187. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (citing Appendices A and B of
the opinion for figures).
188. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015).
189. Id.
190. See id. at 2738–39. Justice Alito, writing for the Court, also upheld the decisions of the
lower courts based on a determination that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly
erroneous. See id. at 2739–46.
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indeed, Glossip illustrates virtually every aspect of new majoritarian
constitutionalism—from the number of states authorizing the punishment,
the extent and direction of legislative change in relation to the punishment,
the extent of the punishment’s use where authorized, and—importantly—
whether a punishment is geographically isolated in a particular jurisdiction or
cluster of jurisdictions.191 Regarding this last factor, Justice Breyer’s dissent
specifically noted that capital prosecutions were being pursued in only a few
isolated counties;192 by removing state boundary lines and inquiring into
capital punishment at the county level, Justice Breyer added an additional,
critical dimension to new majoritarianism that could figure prominently in
subsequent cases.
Justice Breyer began by examining “the trajectory of the number of
annual death sentences nationwide, from the 1970’s to present day”193—
similar to “the direction of change” in Atkins, Roper, and Hall.194 Breyer also
compared the 41 states that allowed for the death penalty in 1972 (the time
of the Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia) with the much smaller number
that did so at the time of Glossip.195 In calculating the number of states, Justice
Breyer looked both to those states that had formally abolished the practice
(19 states and the District of Columbia) and those that had not executed any
prisoners in the eight years prior to the decision (11 additional states).196
Justice Breyer thus determined that 30 states had rendered the death penalty
“unusual” within their borders.197 Breyer’s analysis went even further—noting
that of the 20 states that had executed a prisoner in the eight years prior to
the decision, nine of the 20 had executed fewer than five during that time
period.198 Delving even further into the data, Justice Breyer noted that three
of the “11 States in which it is fair to say that capital punishment is not
‘unusual.’ . . . accounted for 80% of the executions nationwide (28 of the 35)
in 2014.”199
Focusing directly on “the consistency of the direction of change,”200
Justice Breyer noted that seven states had abolished the death penalty
between 2005 and 2015, and that “several States have come within a single
vote of eliminating the death penalty.”201 He noted further that “[i]n the past
two decades, no State without a death penalty has passed legislation to
191. Id. at 2761, 2772–76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 2761.
193. Id. at 2772.
194. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1997–98 (2014); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
555–56, 578–79 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
195. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2773 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2774 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005)).
201. See id. (citations omitted).
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reinstate the penalty.”202 Justice Breyer pointed out that in the states that still
carry out a significant number of executions, the total number of executions
declined considerably.203
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Justice Breyer examined county
data to demonstrate why “the imposition of the death penalty heavily depends
on the county in which a defendant is tried.”204 Justice Breyer recognized that
in 2012—the year before Glossip was decided—“just 59 counties (fewer than
2% of counties in the country) accounted for all death sentences imposed
nationwide.”205 Breyer also noted that “[b]etween 2004 and 2009 . . . just 29
counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for
approximately half of all death sentences imposed nationwide”206 and, during
that same period, “only 35 counties imposed 5 or more death sentences, i.e.,
approximately one per year.”207 In an appendix to his Glossip dissent, Justice
Breyer provided an illustration of the death penalty’s geographic isolation,
which is reproduced in Figure 1-A, below.

202. Id. at 2775.
203. See id. (“In Texas, the State that carries out the most executions, the number of
executions fell from 40 in 2000 to 10 in 2014, and the number of death sentences fell from 48
in 1999 to 9 in 2013 (and 0 thus far in 2015).”).
204. Id. at 2761 (“[T]he single most important influence from 1973–2007 explaining
whether a death-eligible defendant [in Connecticut] would be sentenced to death was whether
the crime occurred in Waterbury [County].” (alterations in original) (quoting John J. Donohue
III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful
Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 673 (2014))).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2774.
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FIGURE 1-A

Counties with Death
Sentences, 2004-2009
5 or more
sentences
Fewer than 5
sentences
Created with mapchart.net ©

Using more recent data between 2010 and mid-2015, and removing
those jurisdictions that do not actually execute prisoners on death row, Justice
Breyer noted that the death penalty had become even more geographically
isolated, with “only 15 counties impos[ing] five or more death sentences.”208
Figure 1-B, below, reproduces that illustration. The counties shaded in black
sentenced five or more individuals to death between 2010 and June 22, 2015;
counties shaded in grey include those that sentenced five or more individuals
to death during this time but no longer execute those on death row. All other
counties in Figure 1-B have fewer than five death sentences since 2010. As
Justice Breyer noted, these statistics highlight not only the rapid
diminishment of capital punishment but also demonstrate, and reflect, “the
power of the local prosecutor.”209

208.
209.

Id. at 2774.
See id. at 2761.

LANDAU_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1064

3/8/2018 1:09 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1033

FIGURE 1-B

Counties with > 4 Death
Sentences Between 2010
and 2015
Executions
Sentences but no
Executions
Created with mapchart.net ©

IV.

DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEW MAJORITARIANISM

The more that major Supreme Court decisions come to illustrate a new
approach to majoritarian constitutionalism, the more the limitations in
narrower, state-polling approaches become plain, both practically and
theoretically.210 While the normative dimensions of new majoritarian
constitutionalism are explored in Part V, this Part shows how the tools of new
majoritarianism can shed significant light on looming controversies that
include per se challenges to the death penalty and life-without-parole
sentences.
A. NEW MAJORITARIANISM AND THE DEATH PENALTY
New majoritarian constitutionalism has major implications for the
constitutionality of the death penalty. While death penalty laws technically do
remain on the books in the majority of the states, the combination of recent
changes in state laws (and the consistency of those changes), jury practices,
gubernatorial moratoria, decline in actual executions, and geographic
isolation undermines the notion that the death penalty remains a
majoritarian institution.211 Under a more comprehensive account of
majoritarianism, the death penalty appears to be the outlier.
The counter-majoritarian nature of current death penalty regimes is
perhaps best illustrated graphically. As noted in Figure 2-A below, the death
210.
211.

See infra Part V.A.1–2.
See supra Part III.C.
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penalty has been abolished either legislatively or through a state court
decision in 19 states and the District of Columbia.212
212. The state of Alaska abolished the death penalty before being granted statehood. Alaska, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/alaska-0 (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
Connecticut: Act of Apr. 25, 2012, Pub. Act No. 12-5, 2012 Conn. Acts 13, 13–27 (Reg.
Sess.) (repealing the death penalty prospectively); State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 13 (Conn. 2015)
(applying the prospective repeal to already imposed capital sentences). D.C.: District of Columbia
Death Penalty Repeal Act of 1980, D.C. Act 3-307, 27 D.C. Reg. 5624 (Dec. 26, 1980) (repealing the
death penalty). Delaware: Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433–34 (Del. 2016) (finding Delaware’s capital
sentencing statute unconstitutional for failure to provide for a jury determination as opposed to judge
determination of the weight of circumstances). While Delaware has not appealed the decision, the
Delaware House passed a bill reinstating the death penalty, subject now to the Delaware Senate’s
vote. See Matthew Albright, Death Penalty, Minimum Wage, Marijuana Votes May Be Put
Off, DELAWAREONLINE (June 26, 2017, 5:01 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/
politics/2017/06/26/death-penalty-minimum-wage-marijuana-votes-may-put-off/428022001
(noting that the death penalty vote in the Delaware Senate would be postponed until 2018). The state
of Hawaii abolished the death penalty before being granted statehood. Hawaii, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/hawaii-0 (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). Illinois: 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/119–1 (2016) (codifying repeal of the death penalty). Iowa: Act of Feb. 24, 1965, ch.
435, 1965 Iowa Acts 827–28 (repealing the death penalty). Maine: ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 1152, 1251
(2006) (indicating life in prison as the maximum sentence in lieu of capital punishment); see Karen
Marks Lemke, Death Penalty’s Demise in Maine, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Apr. 14, 2013), http://
www.pressherald.com/2013/04/14/demise-of-death-penalty-in-maine_2013-04-14 (describing the
events that led to the 1887 death penalty repeal). Maryland: S.B. 276, 2013 Leg., 433d Sess. (Md.
2013) (repealing the death penalty and substituting life without parole as the maximum sentence).
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116, 124–26 (Mass. 1984) (holding the
death penalty unconstitutional as impermissibly burdening the right to jury trial). Michigan: MICH.
CONST. art. IV, § 46 (preventing any law permitting the death penalty). Minnesota: Act of Apr. 22,
1911, ch. 387, 1911 Minn. Laws 572 (amending the punishment for murder to life in prison). New
Jersey: Act of Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, §§ 1–2, 2007 N.J. Laws 1427, 1427–30 (amending the sentence
for murder to life without parole). New Mexico: Act of Mar. 18, 2009, ch. 11, § 5, 2009 N.M. Laws 133,
140–41 (amending the sentence for capital felonies to life in prison). New York: People v. LaValle, 817
N.E.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. 2004) (finding New York’s “deadlock instruction” unconstitutional as coercive
and vacating a death sentence). North Dakota: Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 63, § 1, 1915 N.D. Laws 76, 76
(retroactively abolishing the death penalty for all crimes but one: murder by an inmate serving a life
sentence); Act of Mar. 15, 1973, ch. 116, § 41, 1973 N.D. Laws 215, 300 (abolishing the death penalty
prospectively for murder); see also Act of Apr. 15, 2013, ch. 104, § 11, 2013 N.D. Laws 400,
406 (adumbrating penalties that do not include the death penalty). Rhode Island: Act of May 9,
1984, ch. 221, § 1, 1984 R.I. Pub. Laws 524, 524 (abolishing the death penalty by amending the
sentence for murder to life in prison). Vermont: See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7101–07 (1968),
invalidated by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
384 n.1 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Vermont’s decision not to amend its only law allowing the
death penalty in light of Furman . . . leads to the conclusion that the State rejects capital punishment.”).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-2 (West 2014) (abolishing the death penalty for all
convictions within the state). Wisconsin: The Death Penalty Repeal Act of 1853 (repealing the death
penalty). Wisconsin was “the first state to permanently abolish the death penalty for all
crimes.” Wisconsin, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/wisconsin-0 (last visited
Dec. 28, 2017). For a distillation of the legal landscape of state death penalty law, see Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 11–21, Tucker v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 1801 (2016) (No. 15-946), 2016 WL
355012 [hereinafter Tucker Brief]. Although Nebraska’s legislature recently invalidated the death
penalty, including through a legislative override of a gubernatorial veto, Nebraska voters reinstated the
death penalty in November of 2016 through a ballot initiative. L.B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
2015), repealed by Referendum 426 (Neb. Nov. 8, 2016); see also Krishnadev Calamur, Nebraska
Lawmakers Override Governor’s Veto of Death Penalty Repeal, NPR (May 27, 2015, 5:52 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/27/410024375/nebraska-governors-veto-ofdeath-penalty-repeal-sets-up-override-vote (describing the legislature’s override of the governor’s
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FIGURE 2-A

Death Penalty in the U.S.
States with Death
Penalty
Abolitionist
States

Created with mapchart.net ©

Figure 2-A does not end the analysis, however. First, the Court has made
clear in numerous cases that states with gubernatorial moratoria are the
functional equivalent of abolitionist states.213 And four states—Colorado,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington—have virtually ended the practice by

veto); Paul Hammel, Nebraskans Vote Overwhelmingly to Restore Death Penalty, Nullify Historic 2015
Vote by State Legislature, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.omaha.com/news/
politics/nebraskans-vote-overwhelmingly-to-restore-death-penalty-nullify-historic-vote/article_38
823d54-a5df-11e6-9a5e-d7a71d75611a.html (describing the referendum ballot results, where
only one county supported repealing the death penalty).
213. See supra Part III.C.1.
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way of gubernatorial suspension.214 Figure 2-B indicates those moratorium
states, which are shaded grey; abolitionist states are unshaded.215

214. See Tucker Brief, supra note 212, at 13–14. Colorado: Moratorium enacted May 22,
2013, last execution 1997, see Governor John W. Hickenlooper, Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2013006 (May 22, 2013). Oregon: Moratorium enacted November 22, 2011, last execution 1997, see
Haugen v. Kitzhaber, 306 P.3d 592, 609 (Or. 2013) (recognizing that the Oregon governor has
authority to impose a moratorium); Press Release, Or. Governor John Kitzhaber, Governor
Kitzhaber Issues Reprieve—Calls for Action on Capital Punishment (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.
oregon.gov/newsroom/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?newsid=589. Pennsylvania: Moratorium enacted
February 13, 2015, last execution 1999, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199, 1211 (Pa.
2015) (upholding the Governor’s authority to suspend the death penalty through a reprieve
initiated as the “first step in placing a moratorium on the death penalty in Pennsylvania”);
Memorandum, Pa. Governor Tom Wolf, Death Penalty Moratorium Declaration (Feb. 13, 2015),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/255668788/Death-Penalty-Moratorium-Declaration; Pennsylvania,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/pennsylvania-1 (last visited Dec. 28,
2017) (“The last person executed was Gary Heidnick in 1999.”). Washington: Moratorium
enacted February 11, 2014, last execution 2010, see Governor Jay Inslee, Remarks Announcing a
Capital Punishment Moratorium (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/20140211_death_penalty_moratorium.pdf; John Bacon, Washington Governor
Suspends Death Penalty, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2014, 1:29 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2014/02/11/washington-death-penalty-inslee/5394917 (noting that Washington
last performed an execution in September 2010). In three states, the moratoria have been
extended by the subsequent governor or by the enacting governor upon reelection. See Rick
Anderson, Washington State Has Eight People on Death Row—and No Plans to Ever Execute Them, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-washington-deathpenalty-2017-story.html (noting that in Colorado and Washington, Governors Hickenlooper and
Inslee, respectively, continued the moratoria on reelection, while in Oregon, Governor Kate
Brown continued it). Pennsylvania’s moratorium was implemented by the current governor and
remains in effect. See Sarah Mearhoff, What Will Happen to Pennsylvania’s Death Penalty?, PHILA.
INQUIRER (May 28, 2017, 10:03 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/state/whatwill-happen-to-pennsylvanias-death-penalty-20170527.html (noting that moratorium remains in
effect while the governor awaits the results of a report by the Pennsylvania Task Force and
Advisory Committee on Capital Punishment).
215. The abolitionist states are listed at supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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The sum total of abolitionist and moratorium states are depicted in Figure
2-C below.
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FIGURE 2-C

Death Penalty in the U.S.
States with Death
Penalty
Abolitionist +
Moratorium States
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Although numerous jurisdictions, including several states as well as the
federal government and the U.S. military, have shown little interest in
formally retiring the death penalty, many of these jurisdictions have made
such sparing use of the punishment (or no use at all) that, under the Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, those states are considered functionally
the same as abolitionist jurisdictions.216 As noted in Figure 2-D below, eight
states (plus the federal government and the military) fall into that category.217
These “no-use” states (defined as having three or fewer executions during the
past 50 years) are shaded grey; abolitionist and moratorium states are
unshaded.
216. See supra Part III.C.1.
217. The ten jurisdictions include eight states: (1) Idaho: only three executions since 1976;
(2) Kansas: no executions since 1965; (3) Kentucky: only three executions in the last 50 years;
(4) Montana: only three executions in the last 50 years, with no new sentences since 1997;
(5) Nebraska: only three executions in the past 40 years, with none since 1997; (6) New
Hampshire: no executions since 1939; (7) South Dakota: only three executions in the last 50
years; (8) Wyoming: only one execution in the last 50 years; (9) Federal: only three executions
in the last 50 years; (10) Military: no executions since 1961. See Tucker Brief, supra note 212, at
13–14; see also Executions by State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenalty
info.org/node/5741 (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (listing numbers from 1976); Montana, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/montana-1 (last visited Dec. 28, 2017)
(charting death sentences in Montana 1977–2015).
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FIGURE 2-D

Death Penalty in the U.S.
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The sum total of abolitionist, moratorium, and functionally abolitionist
states are consolidated in Figure 2-E below.
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FIGURE 2-E

Death Penalty in the U.S.
States with Death
Penalty
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States
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Even in the states that do on occasion convict and sentence defendants
to death, many have not executed anyone in a number of years.218 And there
are states in which convicted and sentenced persons live their entire lives on
death row and are not actually executed.219 These “low use” states, defined as
carrying out at most one execution during the past decade—California,
Nevada, North Carolina, Louisiana and Utah—are depicted in Figure 2-F
below.220 The low-use states are shaded grey; abolitionist, moratorium, and
no-use states are unshaded.
218. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. Although some of these states still
occasionally sentence individuals to death, actual executions in those states are unlikely to occur
under existing conditions.
219. For example, in California there are over 700 people on death row, and while the state
continues to sentence individuals to death, no one has been executed since 2006. See James Ridgeway
& Jean Casella, What Death Penalty Opponents Don’t Get, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 30, 2014, 11:15 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/11/30/what-death-penalty-opponents-don-t-get; see also
supra Figure 1-B (indicating California as a state with sentences but no executions).
220. There have not been any executions in California, Nevada, and North Carolina in the past
decade; Louisiana and Utah have each had only one execution. See Rebekah Allen, Louisiana Officials
Struggle with No Way to Execute Death Row Inmates, ADVOCATE (May, 21, 2017, 11:00 PM), http://www.
theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/legislature/article_4d5ed0ba-3ca3-11e7-b98c-dfef358
37ffb.html (finding one execution since 2002); Mark Binker, Ten Years After NC’s Last Execution, AG
Candidates Concur Death Penalty Should Stay Law, WRAL.COM (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.wral.com/
ten-years-after-nc-s-last-execution-ag-candidates-concur-death-penalty-should-stay-law/15912008
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Figure 2-G combines abolitionist states, moratorium states, no-use states, and
low-use states.

(noting that in North Carolina, 11 death row inmates died of natural causes between 2006 and 2016);
Marcella Corona, Is Nevada’s Death Penalty a ‘Broken System?’, J. SENTINEL (Mar. 31, 2017, 6:14 PM),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/30/nevada-proponents-prosecutors-battleover-death-penalty-costs/99807022 (finding that no prisoner has been executed in Nevada since
2006); Executions by State and Year: Utah, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/node/5741#UT (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (noting one execution since 2000); Liliana Segura,
Ten Years After Last Execution, California’s Death Row Continues to Grow, INTERCEPT (Jan. 17, 2016, 5:40
PM), https://theintercept.com/2016/01/17/ten-years-after-last-execution-californias-death-rowcontinues-to-grow (noting no executions in California since 2006). It is unclear whether Nevada will
remain a “low use” state in light of an execution that had been scheduled for October 2017 but which
remains on hold, despite the fact that the inmate scheduled for execution has expressed a steadfast
desire to be put to death. See David Ferrara, Letters to Judge Affirm Nevada Inmate’s Desire to Die, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J. (Nov. 21, 2017, 6:33 PM) (describing Scott Dozier’s letters to the judge requesting death
regardless of how painful the experience might be, and noting that “[o]f the 12 men executed since
Nevada reinstated the death penalty in 1977, 11 have been so-called volunteers”). Until recently,
Arkansas would have been considered a low-use state. Arkansas did not execute anyone on death row
between 2005 and 2016. See Arkansas, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/arkansas-1 (last visited Dec. 28, 2017). However, in April 2017, the state indicated its intent to
carry out 11 executions over an eight-day period, prior to the expiration of its supply of Midazolam, a
lethal injection drug. See Mark Berman, Fourth Arkansas Execution in Eight Days Prompts Questions About
Inmate’s Movements, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/04/27/arkansas-readies-to-carry-out-last-planned-execution-before-drugs-expire.
Since that announcement, the state has carried out four of those executions. See id.
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In total, there are 39 jurisdictions—including 36 states, the District of
Columbia, the federal government, and the U.S. military—that have either
abolished the death penalty or have carried out so few executions (one or
fewer executions per decade over the past half-century) that they are likely
considered functionally abolitionist, at least under new majoritarian analysis.
No wonder that a growing number of briefs by advocates of death penalty
abolitionism—an arena once dominated by a Marbury-style litigation
approach—currently advance consensus-oriented approaches to argue that
capital punishment is far more counter-majoritarian than ordinarily
believed.221

221. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21–25, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17-251 (Aug.
14, 2017), 2017 WL 3531089 (arguing that a combination of legislative trends, executive action,
lack of executions, and geographic isolation undermine the constitutionality of the death
penalty); Brief of Amicus Curiae Fair Punishment Project in Support of Petitioner at 3–18,
Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17-251 (Sept. 15, 2017), 2017 WL 4162290 (same); see also Brief of the
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice and the Criminal Justice Institute as
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2–12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718
(2016) (No. 14-280), 2015 WL 4624172 (invoking a strategy couched in new majoritarian
approaches to seek a categorical bar on all life-without-parole sentences for juveniles). The
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute and Criminal Justice Institute brief also noted Obergefell’s
consideration of “referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as countless
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The point becomes even clearer when counties are considered
separately. The United States is home to more than 3,100 counties, yet death
sentences are limited to a tiny fraction of those counties, where they are
sought by an equally small number of prosecutors. The severe state of
geographic isolation is highlighted in Figure 2-H. Counties that have
sentenced five or more individuals to death since 2010 are shaded in black;
those that have sentenced five or more individuals to death during that time
but have not executed any inmates during that time are shaded in grey.
FIGURE 2-H

Counties with > 4 Death
Sentences Since 2010
Executions
Sentences but no
Executions

Created with mapchart.net ©

B. NEW MAJORITARIANISM AND JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
New majoritarianism also has implications for life-without-parole
sentencing schemes—in particular for juvenile and nonviolent offenders. At
the present time, only 21 jurisdictions ban juvenile life without parole
(“JLWOP”) sentences.222 Nevertheless, like the death penalty, juries seldom
studies, papers, books, and other popular and scholarly writings” as part of its larger argument to
invalidate JLWOP sentences for juveniles. Brief of the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for
Race and Justice and the Criminal Justice Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
supra, at 3.
222. See JOSH ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW
3 (2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-Life-WithoutParole.pdf (noting that 20 states and the District of Columbia ban JLWOP); see also JUVENILE
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impose JLWOP; there is a consistent trend in state legislation against the
practice while, in other states, the practice is rarely if ever used; and, finally,
JLWOP sentences are limited to an exceedingly small and isolated number of
U.S. counties.223
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in Miller,224 only a handful of
states prohibited JLWOP.225 In the relatively short period following Miller, 17
additional jurisdictions (16 states plus the District of Columbia) have
invalidated the practice: four states in 2013;226 two states in 2014;227 three in
2015;228 three more (plus the District of Columbia) in 2016;229 and four more
SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: JUNE
2017 SNAPSHOT 3–16 (2017), https://www.juvenilelwop.org/wp-content/uploads/June%20
2017%20Snapshot%20of%20JLWOP%20Sentences_01.pdf (describing the status of each
jurisdiction, demonstrating that the following jurisdictions have eliminated JLWOP: Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, D.C., Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wyoming).
223. See infra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text (discussing Miller).
225. Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, and Kentucky. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2016) (prescribing
no life sentences, but imposing a mandatory 99-year sentence under certain conditions); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-104(2)(d)(IV) (West Supp. 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(I)
(West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6618 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 640.040(1) (West 2014)
(restricting sentencing for those younger than 16). Montana appears to retain discretionary life without
parole, see MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102(2), 46-18-222(1) (West 2008), but the State has only one
individual currently serving such a sentence. See JUVENILE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 222, at 10
(stating that Montana “appears to give courts discretion to sentence juveniles to LWOP” and listing one
person sentenced to life imprisonment).
226. Delaware, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wyoming. Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney, 1 N.E.3d
270, 284–85 (Mass. 2013) (holding that JLWOP sentences violate the Massachusetts
Constitution); S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013); S.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2d Spec.
Sess. (Tex. 2013); H.B. 23, 62nd Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013). Like the initial six states, Delaware,
Texas, and Wyoming implemented legislation outlawing JLWOP. Note that while Delaware
retained the punishment, the state provides an opportunity for every juvenile sentenced to life
without parole to seek resentencing after serving a portion of his or her sentence. Massachusetts
became the first state to prohibit JLWOP through the courts that same year. The state’s highest
court determined that JLWOP violated the Massachusetts State Constitution, thus abolishing the
practice. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 284–85.
227. Hawaii and West Virginia. H.B. 2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); H.B. 4210,
81st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014).
228. Connecticut, Nevada, and Vermont. S.B. 796, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn.
2015); Assemb. B. 267, 78th Sess. (Nev. 2015); H. 62, 2015 Gen. Assemb., 73rd Sess. (Vt. 2015).
Like many of the states before them, all three did so via legislation. See the bills cited supra in
notes 225–27.
229. The District of Columbia, Iowa, South Dakota, and Utah. The District of Columbia,
South Dakota and Utah followed the example of many earlier states by passing legislation aimed
at prohibiting JLWOP. Comprehensive Youth Justice Amendment Act of 2016, 63 D.C. Reg.
15312, 15312–25 (Dec. 7, 2016) (effective Apr. 2017); S.B. 140, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess.
(S.D. 2016); H.B. 405, 2016 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016). Iowa, however, joined Massachusetts, as
only the second state to outlaw JLWOP through the court system. State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811,
836, 839 (Iowa 2016) (holding that JLWOP sentences violate the Iowa Constitution). Like
Massachusetts, the Iowa Supreme Court found that JLWOP was in direct violation of Iowa’s
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in 2017.230 This continuing momentum to eradicate JLWOP is of obvious
constitutional import; after Atkins,231 Roper,232 and Hall,233 it is fairly evident
that a clear “consistency of the direction of change” points toward JLWOP’s
abolition.
This growing consensus is apparent not just in the jurisdictions that have
legally abolished JLWOP, but also in states that have more or less done so in
practice. Fifteen additional states that still technically permit JLWOP have
rendered the practice virtually obsolete. Five states have sentenced one or no
persons to JLWOP in the last five years.234 Six other states currently have zero
individuals serving JLWOP sentences.235 In addition, four states have five or
fewer persons serving a JLWOP sentence from any time period.236
Additionally, a number of states have significantly curtailed their use of
JLWOP through various legislative actions. For example, Florida, a former
frequent user of JLWOP, has limited the practice to instances where the
defendant “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim”
and was previously convicted of an enumerated felony.237 North Carolina no
longer allows the practice for felony-murder convictions, and Pennsylvania no
longer imposes mandatory JLWOP for second-degree murder.238

constitution. Id.
230. Arkansas, California, New Jersey, and North Dakota. Fair Sentencing of Minors Act of
2017, S.B. 294, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); Parole: Youth Offender Parole
Hearings, S.B. 394, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2017); Assemb. B. 373, 217th Leg. (N.J. 2017); H.B.
1195, 65th Leg. (N.D. 2017).
231. See supra notes 145–53 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 154–61 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
234. Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, and Maryland all have one, and Minnesota has zero. See John
R. Mills et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid Change Underway,
65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 575 & n.233 (2016). Arkansas and Iowa have since legally abolished
JLWOP. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
235. Maine, Missouri, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island. See S.B. 590,
98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016) (commuting existing sentences from life without
parole to 25 years to life with parole eligibility); PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE AFTER MILLER V. ALABAMA 44, 67–68, 79 (2015). The Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledged that Miller should be applied retroactively following the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Montgomery. Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 279 (Minn. 2016). The court concluded that
any JLWOP sentence handed down prior to Miller would be converted into a life sentence with a
possibility for release after 30 years, while those sentenced after Miller would receive a hearing to
determine the appropriate sentence. See id. at 275.
236. Idaho (4), Indiana (5), Ohio (5), and New Hampshire (5). See JOHN R. MILLS ET AL.,
PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, NO HOPE: RE-EXAMINING LIFETIME SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
6 & n.16 (2015) (Idaho, Ohio, and New Hampshire); JUVENILE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note
222, at 6 (Indiana).
237. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (West 2017). The specific enumerated felonies are: “1.
Murder; 2. Manslaughter; 3. Sexual battery; 4. Armed burglary; 5. Armed robbery; 6. Armed carjacking;
7. Home-invasion robbery; 8. Human trafficking for commercial sexual activity with a child under 18
years of age; 9. False imprisonment . . . ; [and] 10. Kidnapping.” Id. § 921.1402(2)(a).
238. S.B. 635, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012); S.B 850, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
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Additionally, the state of Washington abolished JLWOP for criminal
defendants under the age of 16.239
Not unlike the death penalty, the geographic isolation of JLWOP is
revealing: The vast majority of past and current JLWOP sentences are heavily
concentrated in a very small number of jurisdictions. Prior to Miller, roughly
64% of the approximately 2,500 JLWOP sentences across the country came
from five states: California, Florida, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Michigan.240
As previously mentioned, California has eliminated and Florida has
significantly curtailed the practice, which only intensifies the outlier status of
Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Michigan.241 Those three states dominate our
nation’s relationship with JLWOP despite making up less than nine percent
of the U.S. population.242
This pattern of geographic isolation is illustrated in Figure 3-A below,
which represents the counties nationwide that imposed a JLWOP sentence
between 2012 and 2015.243 As Figure 3-A reflects, the vast majority of our
nation’s counties imposed no such sentences. Only a small minority of
counties are responsible for the entirety of nationwide JLWOP sentencing.244
Sess. (Pa. 2012).
239. S.B. 5064, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014). Both the Illinois and New Hampshire
legislatures increased their respective jurisdictional ages for adult court, which could have the
effect of limiting the availability of JLWOP. See H.B. 2404, 98th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013)
(changing the jurisdictional age from 17 to 18); H.B. 305, N.H. Gen. Court, 2015 Sess. (N.H.
2015) (changing the jurisdictional age to 17 from 16).
240. See State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), HUM. RTS.
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-youth-offenders-serving-juvenilelife-without-parole-jlwop (last updated Oct. 2, 2009, 4:23 PM).
241. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)A(i)–(ii) (West 2015) (limiting JLWOP to homicides
involving torture and/or killing of a public safety official); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082, 921.1402
(West 2017) (stating that JLWOP is only available to juveniles who commit capital murder after
previously having been convicted of an enumerated violent felony).
242. Data from the 2010 U.S. Census provides that the total number of people living in
Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Michigan combined is 27,119,391, compared with the overall U.S.
population of 308,745,538. PAUL MACKUN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION
DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf.
243. The issue is even starker when viewed on a local level, whether viewed through the lens
of the last several years or historically. Since 2011, seven counties totaling less than five percent
of the U.S. population have accounted for over 25% of all JLWOP sentences. MILLS ET AL., supra
note 236, at 9 tbl.3. Five counties (Philadelphia, PA; Los Angeles, CA; Orleans, LA; Cook, IL; and
St. Louis City, MO) alone account for more than 20%. Id. at 8 tbl.1. In the last decade, six
counties were responsible for more than 20% of the JLWOP sentences imposed. Id. at 8 tbl.2.
From 1953 through 2015, almost 22% of all JLWOP sentences were concentrated in just five
counties. Id. at 8 tbl.1. The issue is most prevalent in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, where
there are currently 300 people serving JLWOP sentences. PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE IN PHILADELPHIA: A TIME FOR HOPE? 3 (2016).
244. Those counties are as follows: Arizona (Maricopa); California (Kern, Kings, Los Angeles,
Madera, San Diego, Tulare, Ventura); Florida (Alachua, Broward, Clay, Duval, Escambia,
Hillsborough, Lake, Leon, Manatee, Marion, Miami-Dade, Orge, Palm Beach, Pasco, Pinellas,
Polk, St. Lucie, Suwannee); Georgia (Clayton); Iowa (Delaware); Louisiana (Bossier, Calcasieu,
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FIGURE 3-A

Counties with JLWOP
Sentences
JLWOP
No JLWOP

Created with mapchart.net ©

***
What is true about JLWOP245 is also true about life-without-parole
sentences for nonviolent246 offenders: Both are out of step with the course of
most lawmaking institutions. Nearly 30 U.S. jurisdictions currently prohibit
life-without-parole sentences for nonviolent offenses;247 there is a clear legal

De Soto, East Baton Rouge, Jefferson, Lafayette, Lafourche, Orleans, Ouachita, St. Mary, St.
Tammany, Terrebonne, West Feliciana); Mississippi (Coahoma, De Soto, Lee, Wayne); Missouri
(Cass); Nebraska (Douglas); North Carolina (Lee, Mecklenburg, Nash, Rockingham, Wayne);
Ohio (Geauga, Summit); Oklahoma (Stephens); Pennsylvania (Monroe, Montgomery,
Philadelphia, York); South Carolina (Dorchester, Florence); Tennessee (Shelby); and
Washington (Benton).
245. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7–14, Johnson v. Idaho, No. 17-236 (Aug. 10, 2017),
2017 WL 3575738 (arguing that state-law trends abolishing JLWOP demonstrates that the
practice no longer comports with the Eighth Amendment).
246. There is general agreement that an offence is “nonviolent” if it does not involve the use
or threat of physical force or violence against another individual. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROFILE OF NONVIOLENT OFFENDERS EXITING STATE PRISONS 1
(2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pnoesp.pdf (defining a nonviolent offense as
one “which do[es] not involve a threat of harm or an actual attack upon a victim”).
247. See FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, FACT SHEET: NONVIOLENT LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 1–2
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trend against subjecting nonviolent offenders to the harshest and most
punitive sentences;248 actual life without parole sentences are increasingly rare
for nonviolent offenders;249 and the remaining life without parole sentences
for nonviolent offenders are largely isolated to a very small number of
counties.250 These developments and trends suggest that a punishment once
seen as appropriate and necessary by large majorities is becoming “more and
more out of step with contemporary punishment norms.”251
V.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF NEW MAJORITARIANISM

Beyond its practical significance, new majoritarian constitutionalism has
important implications for theoretical debates regarding the role of extrinsic
markers in constitutional decisionmaking. Unlike traditional approaches that
tend to look entirely to state legislation and expansive models that consider
an open-ended array of sources, new majoritarian constitutionalism makes
better use of extrinsic indicators to determine where the majority position on
a given issue really lies. While this theory is not an exact science, it is bounded
by a relatively fixed set of extrinsic markers, and thus it provides a relatively
high degree of consistency and predictability. New majoritarian
constitutionalism can thus foster greater durability to constitutional law,
ensuring buy-in while remaining flexible enough to keep constitutional
doctrine current with broader legal developments. It is a viable middleground position between traditional majoritarian state-polling on the one
hand and subjective, judge-driven counter-majoritarian jurisprudence on the
other.
A. RETHINKING MAJORITARIANISM AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
New majoritarian constitutionalism is more than a theory of mere
outsourcing. Rather, it emphasizes the role of courts in rendering decisions
about how extrinsic sources should figure within the larger constitutional
equation—avoiding “the misguided impression that judicial decisions are
inevitable, meaning that the Court’s composition is largely irrelevant.”252
(2017), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FPP-NVLWOP-fact-sheetMay-2017.pdf (containing a complete list of statutory provisions for all 29 jurisdictions that do
not permit life without parole for nonviolent offenses).
248. See Sarma & Cull, supra note 169, at 547 (noting a “slow but steady rollback of mandatory
minimum laws” since 1998, particularly for nonviolent offenders).
249. See Application for Leave to File Motion for Post-Conviction Relief at 33–36, Seales v. State,
No. 2017-m-744 (Miss. June 2, 2017) (noting that “remarkable level of infrequency” with which lifewithout-parole sentences are given for nonviolent offenses); Sarma & Cull, supra note 169, at
567–68 (discussing the increasing rarity of life without parole sentences for nonviolent offenses).
250. Application for Leave to File Motion for Post-Conviction Relief, supra note 249, at 36
(“Life-without-parole sentences for nonviolent offenses are handed down in a geographically
skewed and isolated manner.”).
251. Sarma & Cull, supra note 169, at 580.
252. Driver, supra note 42, at 758.
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Indeed, new majoritarian constitutionalism indicates just how important the
perspectives of the individual Justices can be, as the Court articulates which
sources are most revealing of majority viewpoints—and how those sources
should be marshalled. In that regard, new majoritarianism can preserve a role
for the Court in the incremental development of new constitutional
decisions.253
1. Recalibrating the Majoritarian/Outlier Dichotomy
While new majoritarian constitutionalism relies on extrinsic sources to
shore up constitutional doubt, it is far less skeptical about interceding into
ongoing disputes of political significance than traditional majoritarian theory.
In that sense, new majoritarian constitutionalism occupies a middle ground
that can bridge the divide between classic counter-majoritarian and
majoritarian views. This theory also brings new perspective to the traditional
dichotomy between majoritarian and outlier legal regimes.
Take Roper, for example. While some commentators have celebrated
Roper as a counter-majoritarian decision254—after all, the Court invalidated
legislative sentencing schemes that appeared to have majoritarian support—
such a view of Roper may not be entirely correct. Roper demonstrates why a
seemingly “majoritarian” set of state laws, when considered in their proper
context, are really outliers. Once the Court recalibrates its lens into extrinsic
sources by examining the laws in action, it can perform a more fine-grained
analysis to determine where the majority position on a given issue really lies—
a process the Court engaged in Roper255 and a host of other cases.256 The cases
indicate why the challenged laws were themselves counter-majoritarian, inviting
judicial override through more creative uses of extrinsic indicators.
New majoritarian analysis helps make sense of, and assimilate,
constitutional decisions that appear to lie beyond ordinary explanation. While
Lawrence has been described as puzzling “given the extreme deference the

253. Cf. id. at 797 (observing that the Court’s ability to protect minority rights has steadily
improved since the Warren Court).
254. See David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 13–14
(2006) (noting that the Court in Roper and Lawrence rendered “countermajoritarian decisions”
by “invalidat[ing] laws enacted by democratically elected legislatures” and analyzing both cases
through the prism of counter-majoritarianism); see also MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 316 (1973) (noting that the Court in
Furman acted in counter-majoritarian fashion by curbing “the human capacity for destructiveness
against the strong tide of the urge to punish”).
255. See supra notes 154–61 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 124–28 (discussing new majoritarian approach
in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)); supra text accompanying notes 145–53 (same
approach in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)); supra notes 154–61 (same approach in
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)); supra text accompanying notes 129–33 and 162–64;
(same approach in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014)); supra text accompanying notes
165–69 (same approach in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)).
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Court has traditionally shown when applying” rational basis review,257 the case
makes sense from the perspective of new majoritarianism.258 Like Roper, the
Court’s more nuanced reading of actual, on-the-ground practices made clear
that the challenged anti-sodomy regimes lacked majoritarian support and
were in fact outliers.
By now it should be clear, as a purely positive matter, that cases like Roper
and Lawrence make far more dynamic use of extrinsic sources than the
literature ascribes to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, scholars continue to
describe these cases as exercises in traditional state-polling. While Corinna
Lain does not dispute the correctness of the outcomes in Lawrence, Roper, and
Atkins, she argues that the Court improperly couched its decisions in the
perspectives of state legislatures,259 adopting an “explicitly majoritarian”260
approach grounded in “state counting”261 that “shatters the conventional
understanding of the Court as a countermajoritarian institution.”262 Mary
Sigler argues, similarly, that the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, by
relying on extrinsic indicators, falls into a “[m]ajoritarian [t]rap”263 that
undermines the force of the ruling itself. As she explains, “reliance on
majority preferences to determine the scope and application of a
constitutional right vitiates the protection afforded by that right.”264
But these critiques may overlook how dynamic majoritarian analysis has
become—with unexpected benefits for some (though not all) litigants
challenging the status quo. A more comprehensive new majoritarian
approach, when used properly, can demonstrate how legal regimes that at
first blush appear majoritarian are truly outliers. Thus, scholars who favor
more counter-majoritarian rulings should consider how a more fine-grained
inquiry into majoritarianism can be useful and important to protecting
constitutional rights.265
Some consensus scholars have espoused a theory of constitutional
development that comes closer to a new majoritarian approach. Barry
Freidman’s work on consensus, for example, often describes constitutional
change as a dialogic process of judicial review and public response, with the
Court constrained by, and in constant conversation with, “the people”—a
257. Klarman, supra note 25, at 437; see also id. at 437–38 (noting that “[u]ntil 1961 every
state in the nation had a law forbidding same-sex sodomy” and “[i]t strains credulity to suggest
that” states with anti-sodomy laws “were acting irrationally”).
258. See supra notes 138–44, 177–82 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy’s close
examination of the relevant state laws’ histories and purposes and their infrequent enforcement).
259. Lain, supra note 10, at 372–73.
260. Id. at 405.
261. Id. at 374.
262. Id. at 369.
263. Mary Sigler, The Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 403, 412
(2011).
264. Id.
265. See supra Parts III.C & IV.

LANDAU_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1082

3/8/2018 1:09 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1033

process that incorporates a role for all three branches.266 In that sense,
Friedman sees a consensus-based approach as potentially obviating, and
possibly curing, the counter-majoritarian difficulty.267 On this view, “judicial
review does not require some special justification given that when courts
engage in it, they [necessarily] adhere to the will of the majority.”268 While
Friedman at times comes close to describing a more traditional, statecounting approach to majoritarian constitutionalism,269 he leaves open the
possibility that if “the principle of deference to governmental decisions” is
insufficient, “the court turns to broader evidence of what majoritarian desire
might be.”270 Although Friedman does not always explain the exact dialogue
he has in mind, or the actual criteria courts use to engage in this conversation,
his dialectical model could certainly be congenial to a new majoritarian
approach.
2. New Majoritarianism and Political Power
While advocates of Marbury-style judicial review are not wrong to see the
Court as playing a critical role in elevating the position of historically
marginalized groups, their dim view of extrinsic indicators can overstate the
need for a purely judicially driven approach. By arguing that the whole point
of constitutional adjudication is to keep matters of certain fundamental rights
out of the hands of the majority, Marbury-backers risk undermining the way
groups can build on political gains as part of a larger, majoritarian-based legal
strategy. Indeed, some civil libertarian advocates could, perhaps unwittingly,
promote mechanisms that make it harder for more severely marginalized
populations to seek judicial redress. Sigler argues, for instance, that because
criminal defendants are among the most unpopular members of society and

266. See Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 580–81 (“[T]he everyday process of
constitutional interpretation integrates all three branches of government: executive, legislative,
and judicial. Our Constitution is interpreted on a daily basis through an elaborate dialogue as to
its meaning. All segments of society participate in this constitutional interpretive dialogue, but
courts play their own unique role. Courts serve to facilitate and mold the national dialogue
concerning the meaning of the Constitution, particularly but not exclusively with regard to the
meaning of our fundamental rights.” (footnotes omitted)).
267. As Justice O’Connor once explained: “[W]e rely on the confidence of the public in the
correctness of those decisions. That’s why we have to be aware of public opinions and of attitudes
toward our system of justice, and it is why we must try to keep and build that trust.” See FRIEDMAN,
WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 3, at 371 (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Public Trust as a
Dimension of Equal Justice: Some Suggestions to Increase Public Trust, CT. REV., Fall 1999, at 10, 13).
268. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People and the Process of Constitutional Change, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1232–33 (2010); see also id. at 1233 (arguing that, owing to the accord
between courts and the people, “the ‘counter-majoritarian’ problem that has so beguiled the
academy is, in the broad terms often stated, hardly a problem at all”).
269. He writes “[t]he Court turns time and again to a head count of states to discern the
majority practice. My own name for this practice is polling, and it is a technique prevalent
throughout constitutional cases.” Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 597.
270. Id. at 601.
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lack the popular support or political power needed to change laws, it is
impractical to rely on extrinsic indicators to protect their rights.271 Lain
argues, similarly, that a majoritarian approach insufficiently protects a group
that is more likely to face ill-treatment by legislative bodies:
Capital defendants are about as unpopular a minority as one can
find (for obvious and perfectly legitimate reasons) . . . . The politics
of death only exacerbate their vulnerability, leaving little reason to
trust other institutional actors to exercise self-restraint. In short, the
death penalty context presents the quintessential case for the
Court’s countermajoritarian function. If there is any place one
would want and expect the Supreme Court to guard against
majoritarian overreaching, it is a capital case.272
Were it true that criminal defendants had made virtually no gains
through ordinary political processes, the argument for an exclusively Marburybased approach would be stronger. After all, objective indicators would be of
little avail to criminal defendants, as there would be no emerging majoritarian
politics on which to wage a consensus-based litigation strategy. But the
Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked the majoritarian gains of criminal
defendants in cases such as Coker,273 Atkins,274 Roper,275 Hall,276 and Graham277
by marshaling extrinsic indicators in new ways, thus expanding constitutional
protections for these constituencies. Recent death penalty rulings are a
reflection of political successes, not failures, and the cases allow the Justices
to tap into emerging developments to gain a better insight into where majority
opinion actually lies. But the arguments by Sigler and Lain risk understating—
and, worse, under-utilizing—the power that some criminal defendants and
others have gained through the political and judicial processes, which can be
harnessed as part of a successful litigation strategy. Given those prior gains, a
purely counter-majoritarian strategy is not necessarily the best hope—and
certainly not the only hope—for obtaining vindication through the courts.
Moreover, a Marbury-based approach runs the risk of asking too much of the
courts, falling on the deaf ears of judges who would be unlikely to accept the
invitation to issue Marbury-style, supremacist decisions.278 In this way, the
271. Sigler, supra note 263 at 412–14.
272. Lain, Deciding Death, supra note 11, at 4–5 (footnotes omitted).
273. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); see supra text accompanying notes 124–28.
274. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see supra text accompanying notes 145–53.
275. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see supra notes 154–61 and accompanying text.
276. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); see supra text accompanying notes 129–33 and
162–64.
277. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); see supra text accompanying notes 165–69.
278. With the election of Donald Trump, the likelihood of the Supreme Court entertaining
such a Marbury-based approach in constitutional rights cases in the near future seems remote. See
Paul Barrett & David Ingold, One of the Biggest Reasons Republicans Stick by Trump, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (July 10, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-07-

LANDAU_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1084

3/8/2018 1:09 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1033

Marbury-or-nothing argument risks overstating the need for a countermajoritarian court to vindicate individual rights in all circumstances.
To be sure, the Court’s rights doctrines could go further—perhaps they
should, and perhaps they will.279 But the apparent lack of progress is not
necessarily a function of a lack of counter-majoritarianism. Courts have
invalidated a host of statutes using extrinsic indicators, and as Part IV
demonstrated, the Court is well poised to invalidate the death penalty and
other sentencing practices under new majoritarian constitutionalism. Thus,
counter-majoritarianism is not a necessary condition to strong judicial review
in context of constitutional rights.280 The civil libertarian critique of
majoritarian-based constitutional approaches overlooks the untapped, rightsbearing potential of such a framework, which is not necessarily an
impediment to strong and effective judicial review.
Under a new majoritarian framework, the Court need not wait for a
supermajority of the states to adopt a particular practice to find that practice
majoritarian in nature. Nor should the Court have to wait, given the wellestablished public choice constraints on legislatures, both state and federal,
that prevent legislative change even when such change would conform with
strong majoritarian views.281 Once it becomes apparent that the status quo is
no longer supported by actual legal practices, the Court is well positioned to
invalidate laws in the name of majoritarianism.
3. New Majoritarianism at the Political Periphery
Of course, Sigler and Lain are correct that a consensus-based approach
can do little for groups who enjoy no political power whatsoever. In those
cases, and with respect to those groups, an expanded model of consensus—if
not a Marbury-style approach—is more critical.282 Indeed, a Court resorting
exclusively to extrinsic markers can do very little to improve the lot of those
who have failed to secure any political traction. Herein lies a danger of any
constitutional theory couched in majoritarianism. At its narrowest, the idea of
a purely consensus-based Constitution risks turning the Bill of Rights on its
head, transforming a part of the Constitution intended as a check on the
majority into a mere expression of it. For such groups, all but the most
expansive approaches would likely fall flat. To the extent that new
majoritarianism relies on emerging political gains by various groups, those
who have failed to secure any political victories would have a hard time
galvanizing extrinsic sources of meaning to their advantage. For this reason,

10/trump-begins-the-rightward-shift-of-america-s-courts.
279. See supra Part IV (noting how a new majoritarian approach could lead to the toppling of
the death penalty and juvenile life without parole).
280. See supra Part III.C.
281. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
282. See supra Part III.B.
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groups outside the political mainstream are unlikely to benefit from
majoritarian constitutionalism.
Groups facing such headwinds will likely turn to more expansive
approaches, and Obergefell’s reliance on such a broad array of influences—
from “debates” and “grassroots campaigns” to “studies, papers, books, and
other popular scholarly writings”283—could be a boon to groups that have
made few gains through the ordinary political process.284 Not surprisingly,
Obergefell has been cited by groups who have secured far fewer of the successes
through the political branches that the LGBT movement has achieved.285
Of course, Justice Kennedy’s articulation of such an expansive list of
extrinsic sources in Obergefell raises a question about stopping points: Are
there any indicators under an expansive approach that do not have some kind
of legal or constitutional meaning? It would be difficult under such an
expansive regime—if not impossible—to distinguish between those indicators
that carry constitutional weight and those that do not. For this reason, the
features of new majoritarianism—which can be quite expansive in their own
right—provide an attractive middle ground position between the narrowest
range of extrinsic sources of meaning on the one hand and an open-ended
(if not unbounded) list on the other.
While there may be other constitutional theories and lines of precedent
that better protect new and evolving legal movements than majoritarian-based
frameworks,286 new majoritarianism highlights how developments outside the
court can have important bearing on judicial decisionmaking. On this theory,
persuading a district attorney’s office or governor’s office can be as important
a development as persuading the legislature or a court of last instance in a
particular state. New majoritarianism promotes a development of

283. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
284. See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
286. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (finding Colorado’s constitutional
amendment, repealing ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of homosexuality,
to be constitutionally invalid and “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class”); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding the City of Cleburne’s
zoning ordinance, requiring special use permits for homes for the mentally disabled,
constitutionally invalid due to “irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded”); U.S. Dep’t
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973) (finding federal legislation, which excluded from
the food stamp program households with unrelated and unmarried individuals living together,
to be constitutionally invalid and “specifically aimed at the ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’”
(citation omitted)); Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding Arizona’s
termination of healthcare benefits for state employees’ same-sex partners constitutionally invalid
due to animus); Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1069–72 (D. Ariz. 2013)
(finding that Arizona’s revocation of driver’s license eligibility for certain deferred action recipients
likely amounted to an equal protection violation based on improper animus), rev’d on other grounds,
757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014). See generally Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (noting how rational basis review has been critical for
emerging social movements seeking to vindicate constitutional rights through litigation).
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constitutional law through the interplay amongst a range of actors—
legislators, governors, jurors, and others—who may reflect popular will as well
as any legislative body.
B. NEW MAJORITARIANISM AND INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS
In order for majoritarian constitutionalism to be not just “a mindset, but
also a process of constitutional interpretation,”287 its parameters should be
defined as clearly and carefully as possible. By anchoring constitutional theory
in more traditional law-making sources—state law and legislative trends,
executive branch policies and decisions, the practices of judges and juries,
and geographic isolation—new majoritarian constitutionalism shows a
respect for political process while providing the Court with discretion to make
the best use of those conventional sources. The theory offers a relatively high
degree of consistency over time, enhancing norms of predictability and longterm stability in constitutional interpretation. New majoritarianism thus has
the advantage of promoting important institutional process values, such as
stability and transparency, while reinforcing the centrality of dialogue in
evolving constitutional meaning.
1. New Majoritarianism and Legal Uncertainty
Even as the Court has made repeated use of new majoritarian approaches
to resolve the constitutionality of various legal regimes, certain aspects of the
Court’s analysis remain largely unexplained—and unresolved. For example,
the Court has not identified whether a “specific number of states [constitutes]
a recognized tipping point.”288 Moreover, phrases such as “consistency of the
direction” seem to rely on uncertain and inexact interpretations about
relevant trends in the law.289 Some scholars find these approaches to be
unusual, or confusing—especially when the Court equates states that
technically allow certain punishments to be nevertheless “functionally
equivalent to states that have prohibited the penalty” when “circumstances in
those states nullify the need for legislative action.”290 These commentators
find statements like this to be overly vague, if not opaque, expressions of the
law, and they call for a more bright-line, rule-based jurisprudence instead.
For Sigler, the Court’s consensus-oriented analysis “lacks political
legitimacy—not because it incorporates the Court’s own judgment, but
because it fails to specify the actual grounds of decision or provide a
meaningful opportunity for critical evaluation of its reasoning.”291 Ian Farrell
287. Driver, supra note 42, at 769.
288. Smith et al., supra note 68, at 2407; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)
(noting that legislative trends can indicate emerging consensus but not specifying the actual
number of states necessary to establish such a trend).
289. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
290. Smith et al., supra note 68, at 2408; see supra Part III.C.1.
291. Sigler, supra note 263, at 415.
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also rejects the Court’s current approach in capital cases that relies on
objective indicators of meaning such as state law, preferring a formal
approach to judicial review grounded in a heightened scrutiny framework.292
Farrell argues that strict scrutiny should apply where there is a reason to
suspect that a punishment is disproportionate—such as where a punishment
seems excessively harsh; the offender is a juvenile, mentally disabled, or
unique in some other way; or where the offense is an omission.293 A
heightened scrutiny approach would place the burden on the government to
show that the challenged sentence is needed to further the traditional aims
of punishment (retribution, incapacitation, or deterrence). On the other
hand, in situations not involving some kind of suspect-category defendant (for
instance, an adult sentenced to prison), there would be no heightened
scrutiny, placing the burden on the party challenging the punishment.294
There are undoubtedly some advantages to the kind of formal approach
Farrell and others propose. But such a framework would also dramatically
reduce judicial discretion and make it harder for the Court to draw upon
extra-judicial developments in sorting out the resolution of various legal
questions. A bright-line approach would also confine the Court, diminish
judicial flexibility, and reduce the Court’s ability to marshal extrinsic sources
to determine whether the legal regime in question really enjoyed majoritarian
support.
Neither is the Court’s case law in this area entirely opaque or unclear.
After all, the Court has relied upon a fairly consistent set of factors across a
range of cases to establish the criteria that guide future cases. Thus, those who
criticize consensus-based approaches tend to be “too quick to overlook” the
value and staying power of the Court’s routine reliance on extrinsic
indicators.295 Given the unexpected legal outcomes that majoritarian
constitutionalism has helped produce, the better approach would be to
clarify, not scrap, majoritarianism so that “the Court [can] gauge societal
consensus while reducing the perception that consensus analysis is outcomedriven.”296 As one group of scholars puts it, “[w]hen it comes to consensus
analysis the Court should mend it not end it.”297
Scholars have argued that the Court should be more “explicit about how
each indicator of consensus stacks up in every case,”298 and while such an
exacting approach could have some advantages, the Court’s recent decisions

292. Farrell, supra note 68, at 303–04, 311–13. Farrell describes his method as “inspired by—
but not identical to—the ‘tiers of scrutiny’ review applied under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Id. at 316.
293. Id. at 316.
294. Id.
295. See Smith et al., supra note 68, at 2400.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2433.

LANDAU_PP_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1088

3/8/2018 1:09 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:1033

have gone quite far in laying out the indicia that “count” in determining
constitutional meaning.299 Although some will argue that open-textured
constitutional frameworks are too easily manipulated, the malleability of the
Court’s current approach can have benefits. Legal patterns that at one time
seem peripheral to the doctrine can reveal themselves to be more legally (and
constitutionally) significant at a later time.300 In this regard, any legal
uncertainty caused by new majoritarian constitutionalism is a byproduct of its
adaptability and its recognition that seemingly majoritarian practices can,
upon closer inspection, constitute legal outliers.
Finally, it should be noted that legal uncertainty is not necessarily a
problem, especially when the Court uses vague standards to occupy a gap left
by the political branches. To the extent there is some elasticity to those
extrinsic markers that “count” in the constitutional equation, the judicial
articulation of relevant constitutional standards may necessarily be imprecise,
if only so that those standards can change shape and evolve over time.301
Instead of reducing constitutional law to a static enterprise, new majoritarian
constitutionalism promotes deeper transsubstantive values while supporting
the possibility of an evolving doctrine of constitutional law.

299. See supra notes 129–37, 138–44, 145–53, 154–61 and accompanying text.
300. Smith et al. also argue that the Court “should count functionally abolitionist states as
abolitionist states” by considering the actual use of a given penalty when deciding whether a state
is abolitionist or retentionist. Smith et al., supra note 68, at 2433. But this modification, which
the authors claim to be more ambitious, is really just a continuation of the Court’s current
approach. Indeed, like many of the other recent, more novel mechanisms for determining
consensus, an evaluation of the actual usage of a particular penalty seems like a reasonable way
to more accurately gauge consensus, as opposed to relying on traditional indicia such as legislative
enactments. Given that more than 80% of all U.S. jurisdictions have “not sentenced anyone to
death since 2004 or . . . not executed anyone over the same time period,” their usage criterion
seems like a logical next step in the Court’s new majoritarian analysis. Id. at 2451. Indeed, Part
IV shows how the Supreme Court will likely use that factor to invalidate various forms of
sentencing in future cases, notably the death penalty and juvenile life without parole.
301. Commentators writing in other areas of the law have at times written positively about
the benefits of uncertainty in legal doctrine. Richard Hasen argues, for example, that
“unmanageable judicial standards have much to commend them” when the Court wades into new
and uncertain places. Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of “Judicially Unmanageable” Standards in
Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1469, 1503 (2002). When the Court
enters “the political thicket, unmanageability may be one of the best tools available for finding
the right paths.” Id. Accordingly, “the more controversial the Court’s normative political theory
underlying the claim in a particular case, the more it should strive to articulate legal standards
that leave wiggle room for future Court majorities to modify.” Id. at 1473. New decisions can then
build on the earlier, more tentative ones. As the Court becomes more engaged with an emerging
doctrine, vagueness can begin to give way to clarity. At that point, “as judicial confidence grows,
perhaps because of extended experience, the argument for depth grows as well.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825, 840 (2008). In that sense, a new
majoritarian orientation can be fully commensurate with a theory of strong judicial review and
even point the way toward a workable form of judicial supremacy that bridges the divide between
traditionally Left- and Right-leaning Justices.
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2. New Majoritarianism and Constitutional Dialogue
A lack of legal clarity—while frustrating—is not always unintentional and
can even be part of a healthy dialogic process toward a more durable
constitutional understanding. Indeed, the Supreme Court has for decades
worked out various legal rules through the gradual articulation of oblique
legal standards. And there are values—including legal-process benefits—to
taking such an approach. The less the Court resolves, the more other
institutions—primarily legislatures—have the room to act. Seen this way, new
majoritarianism reflects a belief in a legal process in which court action will
spawn a larger multi-branch dialogue inside (and outside) the legislature.
Some criminal-law scholars have observed the ways legal uncertainty
inherent within some of the Court’s more open-ended rulings can exert a
positive function. Writing explicitly in the criminal sentencing context, Mary
Fan sees the uncertainty in recent sentencing decisions as “a gentler way to
nudge officials toward policies and sentences that do not push the gray area
of constitutionality while keeping within the Court’s historically cautious role
in checking penal choices.”302 Fan concludes that “[u]ncertainty as to where
the constitutional line extends may lead to greater deliberation informed by
the standards and values underscored as guidelines.”303
New majoritarian constitutionalism can help to induce conversation both
within and without traditional legal frameworks and institutions, and in novel
ways. Whereas a purely Court-centric, Marbury-style approach tends to close
off debate by internalizing the decisionmaking process, new majoritarianism
continues to look outward, engaging a range of institutions, inducing more
citizen deliberation and democratic engagement with law. In that sense, such
an approach may adapt to changing circumstances in ways that are more
durable and lasting.
New majoritarianism also presents enhanced possibilities for dialogue,
not only among the coordinate branches but also with the larger society.
Unlike a purely Court-based model or the traditional approach to consensus,
the hybrid model of new majoritarianism serves a deliberative purpose that a
Marbury-or-nothing approach fails to achieve. Majoritarian-based decisions
are helpful in arenas where dialogue about values and societal norms
dominate, drawing upon more functionalist frameworks allowing
decisionmakers to carefully consider, examine, and converse about legal and
constitutional meaning.304 Interested parties must contemplate the principles

302. Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV.
581, 609 (2012).
303. Id.
304. Cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1214 (2010) (noting how open-ended frameworks, couched in “[l]egal
standards[,] are often valued for their flexibility and their susceptibility to nuanced, contextsensitive interpretation” (emphasis omitted)).
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underlying the decision and engage with the issue personally, stimulating
meaningful thought and discussion. This type of opinion may not be
appropriate for all constitutional cases, but it can be quite beneficial for some.
In many ways, new majoritarianism flips the conventional understanding
of judicial dialogue on its head: Rather than reflect the position of the nation
on contentious issues, new majoritarianism can be a mechanism to facilitate
and induce that dialogue outside the Court and engage the public on pressing
issues.305 In areas where the nation remains divided, new majoritarianism is
an important mechanism for engaging extra-judicial institutions on various
questions. In other words, new majoritarian methodology is useful where
state-polling, or polling more generally, proves inconclusive. The Court’s
creative marshaling of traditional markers of objective meaning can have
important dialogue-reinforcing effects beyond the Court.
Among those scholars who favor the consensus-oriented approach, Barry
Friedman’s characterization of constitutional dialogue appears to be
congenial to new majoritarian constitutionalism.306 On Friedman’s account,
the Court does not make the ultimate decision about the content of
constitutional meaning—the Court remains quite constrained—but it still
plays a role in the development of the law by facilitating a dialogue on the
meaning of fundamental rights with extra-judicial participants.307 Thus, the
Court’s “role is dialogic: courts interpret the Constitution, but they also
facilitate and mold a societywide constitutional dialogue. Through this
societal dialogue the document takes on meaning.”308 Unlike those strands of
consensus constitutionalism that align with a more traditional take on judicial
outsourcing, Friedman appears to leave additional room for the Court to
shape the context in which consensus is achieved.
Criminal law scholars have already noted ways that the Court’s national
consensus decisions can be dialogue-inducing for the rest of the nation. Mary
Fan argues ways that the functionalist reasoning in decisions like Graham are
less about the Court reflecting a national consensus and more about the Court
shaping that consensus.309 As she explains, Graham “made deliberation
important again in a heated arena where full evaluation of the benefits and

305. One finds a similar idea in the work of Alexander Bickel. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at
240–43 (contrasting the Court’s ability to foster a broader national consensus on the issue of
racial segregation with its inability to do so on the subject of capital punishment); see also Gerald
B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Century’s End, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 33 n.106 (1999) (“Professor Bickel’s entire project concerning ‘the passive virtues’ rests on
the assumption that the Court, if it does its job right, can move the nation in the direction of a
national consensus on difficult issues . . . . This is, for instance, clearly what he sees as having
happened on the question of racial segregation, and it is, in his view, what could have happened
but did not with respect to the death penalty.”).
306. See also supra notes 266–70 and accompanying text.
307. Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 3, at 653.
308. Id. at 583.
309. Fan, supra note 302, at 609.
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costs of ratcheting up penal severity had dramatically receded.”310 Supreme
Court Justices have made similar remarks about the need to induce
deliberation outside the Court. Consider, for instance, remarks by Justice
Kennedy in a speech about criminal sentencing reform:
The debate on the purposes of prison—should it be deterrence,
should it be prevention, should it be rehabilitation—has gone on for
a long time. But please don’t think it’s a tired debate. That . . .
debate must be renewed given the number of people we have in our
prisons. We have to find some way to bridge the gap between
skepticism about rehabilitation and the fact that so many of your
fellow citizens and your fellow humans are being maintained in
prison . . . . There are . . . reasons for incapacitation. But that simply
can’t be the sole function of our prisons . . . . It is not acceptable for
all of our prisoners and for all of our prisons to borrow a sign from
Mr. Dante’s Inferno: “Leave aside all hope ye who enter here.”311
In short, the idea of dialogue has emerged as a significant factor in the Court’s
new majoritarian jurisprudence. While the criteria for Court action are not
entirely self-evident, they take note of (without requiring) legislative success
and are driven by a consensus-based approach across various institutions (and
not just legislatures) about the best way to determine the majority position on
a given legal question.
Commentators discussing the Court’s LGBT jurisprudence have reached
similar conclusions. Larry Tribe, commenting on Obergefell, sees Justice
Kennedy’s ruling
as deliberately fostering and enriching broad public debate
regarding issues like same-sex marriage. That ambition is not far
removed from the idea . . . that the Court should play an educative
role in society, furthering the public’s knowledge and
understanding both of the Constitution and of the vast array of legal
issues that the Court confronts each year.312
Speaking more broadly to Justice Kennedy’s judicial philosophy, Tribe argues
that his jurisprudence “has always been fundamentally rooted in the
importance of fostering dialogue among ordinary citizens and, in a sense,

310. Id. at 605.
311. Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the American
Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), https://www.c-span.org/video/?1777722/keynote-address&showFullAbstract=1 (providing quoted remarks at time stamps 27:41 to
29:15 and 31:02 to 31:15).
312. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 26–27
(2015); see also id. at 23 (“Justice Kennedy’s opinions have repeatedly emphasized the notion
that, through the decisions it announces and the reasons it offers for those decisions, the Court
does more than resolve the particular ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ entrusted to it for resolution.
He has observed: ‘By our opinions, we teach.’”).
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even among the very clauses of the Constitution itself.”313 This aspect of Justice
Kennedy’s decisionmaking is vividly on display in the sentencing, due process,
and equal protection contexts discussed earlier.314 Throughout those cases,
new majoritarian constitutionalism induces conversation both within and
without traditional legal frameworks and institutions—making inter-branch
dialogue possible and producing more citizen deliberation and democratic
engagement with the law.
VI.

CONCLUSION

During the past several decades, the Supreme Court has made creative
use of extrinsic sources of meaning through a comprehensive analysis of the
actual decisions of courts and juries, legislative trends, executive branch
practices, and geographic disparities within various jurisdictions. The Court’s
decisions have implications both for looming constitutional issues and deeper
normative debates; moreover, the case law provides a reframing of the way
commentators have traditionally thought about constitutional consensus. To
those commentators who equate majoritarianism with state-polling and
nothing else, new majoritarian constitutionalism shows a side of consensusbased jurisprudence that is worthy of deeper reflection and additional
consideration. And to those who criticize majoritarian-based
constitutionalism for its underappreciation of the Court’s countermajoritarian function, a new, more dynamic understanding of
majoritarianism can demonstrate how superficially majoritarian laws can, on
further reflection, be deemed legal outliers and prone to judicial override.

313. Id. at 23; see also id. at 24 (“The focus on the importance of dialogue, both among people
and institutions at any given time and across the centuries, is evident throughout Obergefell. It
becomes most explicit when Justice Kennedy describes the multitude of ways in which ‘new
dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often through perspectives that
begin in pleas or protests and then are considered in the political sphere and the judicial
process.’” (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015))).
314. See supra Part III.

